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THE CIVILLY-COMMITTED PUBLIC
MENTAL PATIENT AND THE RIGHT
TO AFTERCARE
RICHARD B. SAPHIRE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in in-
sidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.'
The history of American social policy regarding the mentally
i112 has, in many respects, been less than a proud one. Until the mid-
nineteenth century, public attitudes toward the mentally ill were
primarily characterized by fear and suspicion. These attitudes were
reflected in governmental policies which, although frequently cloaked
behind the rubric of concern for the treatment and welfare of the
mentally disabled, were evidenced by total neglect and abdication of
public responsibility. Perhaps because of the predominant political
and economic helplessness of most public mental patients 3 a long-
overdue reexamination of the actual conditions and effects of mental
institutionalization, and a reevaluation of the role of the institution
itself in mental health system, have only recently been initiated.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. B.A., Ohio State University,
1967; J.D., Northern Kentucky State College of Law, 1971; LL.M., Harvard University,
1975.
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M.
degree awarded the author by Harvard University.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
2. For purposes of this article, "mental illness" will be used, in the generic sense,
to include a handicap in mental functioning, either psychological or physiological in
origin, which impairs the ability to function in society according to socially prescribed
norms. For examples of statutory definitions of mental illness, see S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 66-71 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
BRAKEL & ROCK].
The above definition would include persons diagnosed as mentally retarded. For a
very informative discussion of basic facts about the traditional clinical and theoretical
types of mental illness and retardation, see 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDI-
CAPPED 35-75 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1974).
It should be noted that there is some opinion in the psychiatric community that
mental illness does not exist objectively, but is rather a fiction created by psychiatry.
For an intriguing discussion of this idea, see T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS
(1961).
3. See, e.g., A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958).
See also note 46 and accompanying text infra.
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Much has been said concerning the need to guard against ar-
bitrariness and abuse in the methods by which an individual comes to
find himself in a public mental institution-whether by choice or
by the exercise of coercive governmental action.4 And yet, it was
not until the beginning of the last decade that serious discussion was
initiated in the legal and medical communities concerning the plight
of the public mental patient once commitment has been effected.5
The controversy and concern generated by these discussions, coupled
with developments in psychiatry and a greater appreciation of the
need to protect individual civil rights, have created a favorable
climate for further examination of the traditional governmental ap-
proach to the delivery of mental health services. In this climate, efforts
can now turn to a more critical attempt to define the appropriate
scope of the states' powers vis-a-vis the mentally handicapped, and,
just as importantly, the special responsibilities created by the exercise
of those powers.
This article will explore a new frontier in the area of the states'
obligations towards the involuntarily committed public mental pa-
tient 6-a frontier emerging as a result of recent developments in con-
stitutional law and contemporary perceptions of the public mental
institution. The impact of institutionalization on the mentally handi-
capped will be assessed, and arguments developed for the creation
of an obligation of the states to provide aftercare services for dis-
charged mental patients. It has been noted that there is "little sense
in guarding zealously against the possibilities of unwarranted depriva-
tions prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the
patient disappears behind mental [hospital] doors." 7 This article will
proceed from the premise that it makes just as little sense, in terms
of both public policy and constitutional law, to abandon the watch
once the patient leaves the institution, especially where the nature
4. See, e.g., Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274 (1953);
Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Il1, 50 MICH. L. REv. 837 (1952); Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
5. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974), and articles
cited therein.
The issue of the existence of a constitutional right to treatment for the non-dangerous,
involuntarily committed mental patient was recently presented to the United States
Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See section VB infra.
6. For purposes of this discussion, involuntary civil commitment can be defined as
the process by which, pursuant to statutorily created procedures, a person judged to
be mentally ill is removed, without his consent or acquiescence, from his normal sur-
roundings to a hospital or other institution authorized to detain him. See BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 2, at 35.
7. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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of the institutional experience has created new mental and physical
handicaps.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE VOLUNTARY PATIENT
The article will deal primarily with the characteristics and prob-
lems of mental institutionalization as they are brought to bear upon
the public mental patient. Although the arguments for the right to
aftercare developed herein are in large part premised in the coercive
or non-consensual aspects of involuntary civil commitment, they are
equally applicable, in many respects, to the voluntarily admitted
patient. In general, it is the exercise of the states' mandatory processes
against the individual that has traditionally been held to create a con-
comitant obligation for the development of formal protections,8
whether in the form of procedural safeguards9 or publicly-funded ser-
vices.' 0 Traditionally, the states' obligations to provide resources and
services to the individual, and the underlying determination of the
allocation of public funds, have generally been considered a matter
of legislative prerogative, not of constitutional command.11 But where
a state exercises its coercive powers in such a manner that unconstitu-
tional conditions and practices result, it will be compelled by the
courts to eliminate the unconstitutionalities, even where to do so would
compel it to take steps that would not otherwise have been required. 2
In this respect, the obligation to provide aftercare services as a necessary
corollary to the operation of public mental institutions may be viewed
as closely linked to the coercive nature of the civil commitment pro-
cess.
Voluntary admissions to public mental hospitals have been viewed
by many mental health professionals as preferable to involuntary civil
commitment. It has been suggested that a patient who recognizes his
8. See generally Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward A Model
of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (hearing required prior to
parole revocation); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (hearing required prior to
replevin of personal property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required
prior to revocation of welfare benefit).
10. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent divorce plaintiff en-
titled to access to courts unconditioned upon paying filing fees); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant entitled to attorney); Griffin v. Il-
linois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (convicted criminal entitled to free transcript on appeal);
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (involuntarily committed mental patient
entitled to treatment and habilitation).
11. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
12. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385
(E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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own mental disabilities and who seeks professional help on his own
volition is much more likely to participate actively in his own treat-
ment, and is thus better able to benefit from his experiences in a
mental institution.?3 Consequently, advocates of a voluntary approach
to mental institutionalization have argued that long-term confine-
ment to mental hospitals, even where progressive treatment programs
have been initiated, has severe therapeutic limitations where the
patient is maintained on an involuntary status.14 Moreover, voluntary
admissions have been viewed as minimizing the stigmatization tra-
ditionally associated with the involuntary commitment process.1 5 The
technical distinctions between the two processes, however, must be
viewed cautiously since their utilization in actual practice frequently
results in an obfuscation of their formal differences.
For purposes of analysis, voluntary hospitalization can be defined
as a process by which one becomes a patient at a mental hospital,
either by self-initiated personal application or through acquiescence
in the application of another in one's behalf.16 Virtually every state
makes statutory provision for the voluntary admission of the mentally
ill and the procedure generally requires a formal application. 7 Unlike
the involuntary commitment process, which generally requires a ju-
dicial determination of mental illness, voluntary admission is cus-
tomarily a matter left to the direction of the chief administrative
officer of the mental institution18 Some typical characteristics of the
voluntary admission procedure tend to indicate that it is not always as
"voluntary" as its formal designation implies.
In this regard, it must be noted that statutory constraints are fre-
quently imposed on voluntary public mental patients which act to
13. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 17.
Although increasing numbers of public hospital mental patients are voluntary, the
overwhelming majority of patients are involuntarily committed. N. KIrRIE, THE RIGHT
TO BE DIFFERENT 71 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 755, 773 n.56 (1969).
15. The stigmatization associated with commitment is discussed at Note, The New
York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 672, 673 n.9 (1967).
16. For a comprehensive discussion of voluntary admission to public mental hospitals,
see BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 17-33.
17. Id. at 19.
18. See R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 34 (1968). The authors note the existence of a third form of ad-
mission, frequently called a "non-protested admission." This procedure has many
characteristics of a purely voluntary one, but depends on a lack of protest on the
part of the patient at the time of admission rather than an affirmative act indicating the
exercise of free choice. Id. at 38. See also B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL
PATIENTS 36 (1973).
1976]
236 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:232
abridge their liberty to leave the hospital and frequently result in
substantially increased risk of involuntary commitment. 9 Typically,
the statutory scheme will require the voluntary patient to give written
notice of his desire to leave within periods ranging from 48 hours to
15 days of the desired date,2 0 during which period the superintendent
of the institution or other interested parties can initiate involuntary
commitment procedures. Thus, in a very real sense, a voluntary
patient can be transformed into an involuntary one by his mere
presence in the institution. Moreover, the voluntary patient, al-
though complying with procedural prerequisites for the achieve-
ment of that status, quite often does not enter the mental institution
under conditions that are in fact voluntary. It has been noted that
there is a large-scale inducement to many persons already in some form
of official custody, or persons threatened with such a prospect, to
"voluntarily" commit themselves to a public mental institution.2 1
Many voluntarily-admitted patients are brought to the hospital by
the police and are "persuaded" that their signing of the appropriate
applications will ensure their receiving the kind of attention and
treatment that they could not receive in a local jail. Still others are
brought to the hospital by friends, relatives or even the family
physician and are similarly "persuaded" that voluntary admission will
be for their own good, or are threatened with the alternative prospect
of the initiation of involuntary commitment or criminal procedures
against them.22 In these circumstances, the legal distinctions concern-
ing voluntary and involuntary admission are significantly blurred.
The advantages of voluntary admission to public mental institu-
tions are further minimized where a minor or incompetent is admitted
pursuant to the initiative of a parent or guardian. Although the parent
or guardian may have the legal power or right to effectuate such an
admission, it is clear that the interests of the two parties may frequently
conflict. It has been observed that families seeking commitment of al-
legedly mentally-handicapped children often exhibit severe stress,
dislocation and disharmony. 23 The children are often not mentally ill
at all, but rather are disagreeable or difficult to handle within the
19. Szasz, Voluntary Mental Hospitalization, An Unacknowledged Practice of Medical
Fraud, 287 NEW ENGLAND J. ME. 277 (1972).
20. See generally BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 22. Cf. Emery v. State, 483
P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971).
21. Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally 111, 66 Nw. U.L.
REV. 429 (1971),
22. See discussion and authorities, id. at 433 n.18.
23. Brief for Plaintiffs at 9-10, Bartley v. Haverford State Hosp., Civil No. 72-2272
(E.D. Pa., Nov. 17, 1975).
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family unit.24 For them, little solace can be found in the knowledge
that prolonged mental hospitalization was initiated pursuant to a
procedure that the law deems voluntary.
One final consideration should be entertained before a formal
distinction between voluntary and involuntary mental hospitalization
is accepted at face value. One view of voluntary admission envisions
the relationship between the patient and the hospital as essentially
contractual.2 5 In exchange for the patient giving up his freedom of
movement and accepting certain other restrictions, the state agrees
to provide the patient with certain services and therapeutic benefits.
It is extremely doubtful, however, that the exact terms and conditions
of institutional confinement are ever objectively and comprehensively
explained to the voluntary applicant.26 It has been suggested that, in
most states, the voluntary patient is not told at the time of his request
for admission that he will not be absolutely free to leave at his own
discretion.2 7 Furthermore, it is quite likely that the reality of life in
the institution, including the sometimes pervasive dehumanization
and neglect inherent therein,2 8 is not adequately disclosed. In short,
the voluntary patient is frequently unaware of exactly what he is
getting himself into.
In light of these considerations, a distinction between the rights
of voluntarily-admitted and involuntarily-committed mental patients
must be cautiously drawn. Insofar as a patient is admitted to a public
mental institution under circumstances that are truly voluntary, the
constitutional arguments for aftercare that will be developed in this
article may be conceptually diminished. But regardless of the legal
status of the patient, there is little question that a person who
voluntarily admits himself for institutionalized treatment makes a
sacrifice in personal liberty comparable to that of the patient who is
compelled by the state to submit to such treatment. Moreover, there is
little significant difference between the rights of different categories
of mental patients in terms of formal or informal restrictions upon the
exercise of civil rights.2 9 The potentially destructive and antithera-
24. See Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental
Institutions, 62 CALIr. L. REv. 840 (1974).
25. See, e.g., Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 440.
26. In this respect, the validity of the contract of confinement is subject to question.
Cf. L. SIMPsoN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CONaAAcrs 67 (2d ed. 1965).
27. B. ENNIs & L. SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 37. But see Roberts v. Paine, 199 A. 112
(Conn. 1938) (hospital held to have no obligation to inform voluntary patient of his
right to leave the hospital).
28. See section IV infra.
29. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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peutic conditions of mental institutionalization, to be discussed below,
apply equally to them all.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MENTAL INSTITUTION
The public mental institution is a relatively recent phenomenon
in the development of organized society's approach to mental illness.
At common law, there was little concern with questions relating to
confinement of the mentally ill because public institutions for custody
or care of the mentally abnormal were nonexistent.30 Societal attitudes
toward mental illness have ranged from the brutal tortures of the
Middle Ages, designed to exorcise the demons thought to be possessing
the mentally deviant,3 ' to an enlightened, humanistic view that has
begun to be manifested in contemporary medical-legal circles. Per-
haps the only common thread woven into the history of formal
governmental policies vis-a-vis mental illness has been fear of the
violence and destructiveness that have been thought inherent in the
lunatic or the "madman."
The English concern for the mentally ill was characterized by
policies designed primarily to protect the property and estate of the
afflicted during periods of incapacitation. Sometime between 1255
and 1290, the statute De Praerogativa Regis was enacted,32 dividing
the mentally disabled into two classes, the idiot and the lunatic. The
idiot was considered a person whose mental abnormality was trace-
able from birth, while the lunatic was viewed as having lost his "use
of reason" sometime after birth . 3  The king was given custody and
control of the idiot's property and provided necessaries to him while
retaining profits from his land. The lunatic's estate was entrusted to
the king during periods of incapacity. The king applied profits from
the estate to the maintenance of the lawful owner, and the surplus
was returned during lucid intervals when the afflicted person was
thought to have regained his competency.34 No formal institutions were
30. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131-33 (Gavit ed. 1941). For general dis-
cussion of the evolution of social policy concerning mental illness from Roman times, see
BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 1-13.
See generally A. DEUTsCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter
cited as DEUTSCH].
31. Shryock, The Beginnings: From Colonial Days to the Foundation of the Amnerican
Psychiatric Association, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY 1 (J. Hall, G.
Zilboorg & H. Bunher eds. 1944). See also KIrnIE, supra note 13, at 56.
32. 17 Edw. 2, c. 9, 10. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 480-81 (2d ed. 1898).
33. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 2.
34. For one of the earliest English cases expounding the law of insanity, see
Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603).
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created to house and care for the mentally ill, this responsibility
generally having been entrusted to relatives or heirs.
In colonial America, the family, or others personally interested in
the welfare of the mentally-handicapped individual, remained the
primary institution responsible for the care and maintenance of the
mentally ill2 5 Only where family or friends were unable to provide
for the ill person's welfare did the local or colonial government offer
material assistance. Moreover, public concern was generally focused
on the dangers and disruptions to community safety and welfare
that were perceived as inherent in mental illness.3 6 No formal
social policy existed to deal with the indigent mentally ill who had no
family or friends able or willing to look after them. Consequently,
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mental illness be-
came, in large part, an incidental element of the operation of the
poor laws. Mental illness and dependency were frequently viewed as
mutually inclusive conditions. The indigent mentally ill, ostracized
from their communities, often banded together with other derelicts
and paupers and roamed the countryside living as best they could off
the land. Prior to the mid-eighteenth century, the great majority of
the insane were confined in local almshouses and jails and treated as
common criminals or paupers.3 7
In the mid-eighteenth century, social pressures inherent in the
industrialization and urbanization of much of America created a move-
ment towards more formal institutions for the mentally ill. Rapid
population growth and the accelerated interpersonal contact brought
about by urban migration greatly increased the general visibility of
social deviancy and brought into sharper focus the need to develop
a broader and more organized approach to the mentally ill. It be-
came evident that local almshouses and jails could no longer ac-
commodate the increasing numbers of mentally-handicapped persons
brought to the attention of the community. The problem was
exacerbated by a large influx of lower-class immigrants who were often
unable to adjust culturally or economically to the largely impersonal
life of industrialized cities.3 8 Coupled with the increased financial and
administrative inability of local facilities to adequately provide for
the mentally ill was a philosophical awakening leading to the convic-
tion that human social problems were manageable and susceptible of
35. See generally G. GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO
1875 (1973).
36. R. RocK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 18, at 12.
37. A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES 33-34 (1948); DEUTSCH, supra note 30,
at 420-21.
38. GROB, supra note 35, at 37-38.
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rational and benevolent solution.39 Moreover, a new concept of
morality, influenced by the French Revolution, slowly began to affect
popular attitudes concerning public responsibility for the socially
and culturally deprived.40
In response to these trends, states began to establish large mental
institutions to house and provide for the mentally ill.41 By 1870, most
states had at least one public mental hospital.4 2 But from the outset
these institutions and their patients were faced with enormous prob-
lems. Albert Deutsch, a noted historian and critic of American mental
institutions, has noted:
Hardly were hospitals opened than their capacities became over-
taxed by the never-ceasing flow of patients. Overcrowding soon
forced upon authorities the problem of selection. Faced with the
necessity of admitting a certain number of applicants and exclud-
ing others, authorities naturally favored the admission of recent
cases over chronic and incurable cases. Gradually, then, there de-
veloped the custom-in some states amounting to an "unwritten
law," in others explicitly stated in statutes-of sending only acute
cases to institutions for the insane, while the chronics (sometimes
euphemistically called the "surplus insane") were confined in poor-
houses and jails or else supported in the homes of friends or relatives.
Generally, if a dependent patient in a hospital was not discharged
recovered within a stipulated period (say, twelve months), he was
returned from the hospital to his place of settlement as incurable
and was thenceforth maintained at a local institution, usually the
poorhouse or jail.43
The unexpectedly high population growth and the discovery that
cure rates" were significantly lower than anticipated resulted in
39. In many respects, the mid-nineteenth century witnessed a growth in optimism
concerning the curability of mental illness generally, and the movement toward the
establishment of large mental institutions can be viewed as having been partially
stimulated by the belief that they would provide an optimal setting for proper treat-
ment. D. ROTHMAN, THE DiscovERy OF THE ASYLUM 130-37 (1971). See also DEUTsCH,
supra note 30, at 153.
40. See DEuTscH, supra note 30, at 56; Visotsky, Adequacy of Treatment and Pro-
visions for Methods of Assuring Adequacy of Treatment, THE MENTALLY ILL
AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 63 (G. Morris ed. 1970).
41. The first general hospital to receive mental patients was established in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania in 1751. DEUTSCH, supra note 30, at 58-59. In 1773, a privately-
funded hospital which was exclusively devoted to care of the mentally disabled was
erected in Williamsburg, Virginia. Id. at 66. The Eastern Kentucky Lunatic Asylum,
established in 1822, was the first mental hospital constructed and operated exclusively
with state funds. Id. at 106.
42. GROB, supra note 35, at 130-31.
43. DETrscH, supra note 30, at 231.
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unmanageable overcrowding, expense, and reduction in the quantity
and quality of care that could be accorded each patient. Moreover,
prior to 1860 there were few statutory provisions relative to conditions
for, and limitations upon, admission to mental institutions. The de-
cision to admit rested wholly within the discretion of the hospital
administrator, who would often be under great pressure to admit
especially indigent persons in view of the lack of alternatives for sup-
port and care in the community.
The movement towards the creation of state mental institutions
was stimulated by the crusading of individuals such as Dorothea
Lynde Dix. From 1840 to 1880, Mrs. Dix carried on a private crusade
to expose the conditions existing in poorhouses and local jails and
effectively lobbied in many states for the creation of public institu-
tions and for rational and fair admission procedures.44 But despite
the progressive, humanitarian work of such mental health reformers,
the institutions themselves, in terms of the pervasive substandard and
dehumanizing aspects of patient-life, continued to deteriorate. In
many respects, the people who became state mental patients were
doomed to despair and deprivation once the asylum doors closed be-
hind them. They were, by definition, the rejects of society-the old, the
poor, the helpless, and the unwanted. The public mental institution's
history has been pervaded by the neglect and apathy of a society which,
in other areas, became increasingly sensitized to and concerned with
the despair and frustration of its people; yet this despair and frustra-
tion permeated the lives of many of the same people who became
the mental institution's primary constituency.
Even today, the social characteristics of most public mental pa-
tients can be perceived as a pivotal factor in society's general lack of
enthusiasm and commitment to reforming and improving public
mental institutions. Admissions to state mental hospitals have pri-
marily come from what has been referred to as the "residual" popula-
tion.45 Numerous studies have shown striking correlations between
social class and mental illness, with overwhelming evidence proving
that most public mental patients come from deprived social and
economic backgrounds. 46 Moreover, a majority of those admitted to
44. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 8.
45. I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL 32 (1956).
46. The seminal work in this field is A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS
AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958). See also J. MYERS & L. BEAN, A DECADE LATER: A FOLLOW-UP
OF SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1968); L. SROLE, T. LANGNER, S. MICHAEL, M. OPLER,
& T. RENNIE, I MENTAL HEALTH IN THE METROPOLIS: THE MIDTOWN MANHATTAN STUDY
(1962).
One writer has gone so far as to say that the primary criteria for distinguishing
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state institutions have achieved a relatively low level of formal educa-
tion.41 Similarly, the overall political and economic powerlessness of
state mental patients can be inferred from the disproportionate
numbers of elderly citizens who are civilly committed. 4 a In a very real
sense, these institutions have become the "dumping grounds" for
the aged and senile, whose common bond can perhaps be more ac-
curately perceived as poverty and rejection rather than mental ill-
ness.
IV. INSIDE THE MENTAL INSTITUTION
A. An Overview of Institutional Life
Some physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the animals of
nearby piggeries were better housed, fed, and treated than many
of the patients on their wards. I saw hundreds of sick people
shackled, strapped, straightjacketed, and bound to their beds. I
saw mental patients forced to eat meals with their hands because
there were not enough spoons and other tableware to go around-
not because they couldn't be trusted to eat like humans. I saw
them crawl into beds jammed together, in dormitories filled to
twice or three times their normal capacity. I saw them incarcerated
in "seclusion rooms"-solitary isolation cells, really-for weeks and
months at a time. I saw signs of medical neglect, with curable pa-
tients sinking into hopeless chronicity. I found evidence of physical
brutality, but these paled into insignificance when compared with
the excruciating suffering stemming from prolonged, enforced idle-
ness, herdlike crowding, lack of privacy, depersonalization, and the
overall atmosphere of neglect. The fault lay not with individual
physicians, nurses or attendants-underpaid, undervalued, and over-
worked as they were-but with the general community that not only
tolerated but enforced these subhuman conditions through financial
penury, ignorance, fear and indifference.49
who will or will not be involuntarily committed in a mental hospital are wealth and
social importance. T. Szasz, Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Crime Against
Humanity, Aug. 4, 1967 (unpublished paper presented in part at the International and
Comparative Conference on Mental Illness and the State, Northwestern University School
of Law, Chicago, Illinois, in Harvard Law School Library).
47. Biometry Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 104
(1974). Other surveys have also shown that the utilization of state and county mental
hospitals is inversely related to level of education. E.g., Biometry Branch, National
Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 34, at 1, 2 (1970), which showed that during
1969, about 20% of total admissions had not completed grade school, about 16% had
completed grade school only, about 27% had attended high school but did not gradu-
ate, and an additional 27% completed high school only.
48. F. CHU & S. TROTTER, THE MADNESS ESTABLISHMENT 40-41 (1974); Gainfort,
How Texas Is Reforming Its Mental Hospitals, 19 THE REPORTER, Nov. 29, 1956, at 19.
49. Hearings Before the Subcomnin. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
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This observation by one of the most noted historians and ob-
servers of American public mental institutions vividly describes the
life that awaits the public mental patient once the institutional doors
close behind him. Prior to attempting the effort of exploring potential
legal arguments for the states' obligations to provide aftercare services
for the involuntarily-committed mental patient, it is essential to
understand the nature and scope of the physical and mental depriva-
tions that have been an inevitable part of the institutional environ-
ment.
In this context, the process of institutionalization creates certain
inherent problems for the public mental patient. In one of the
earliest and most important attempts to describe the experience of
the committed mental patient, Erving Goffman graphically illustrated
the immense depersonalization and dehumanization associated with
the introduction to institutional life.5° Upon entrance, the patient
is stripped of self-conceptions that were made possible by social rela-
tionships on the outside. He loses his possessions, his privacy, and any
developed concept of personal responsibility; "he begins a series of
abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self." 51
The mental institution, described by Goffman as a "total institu-
tion," can be viewed as disrupting precisely those behavioral and nor-
mative patterns that are necessary for a person to acquire and develop
self-determination, autonomy, and responsibility. 2 Moreover, for the
involuntary patient, the shock of the often strict regimentation of the
institution follows closely on the heels of the trauma and confusion
that usually accompany the commitment process, which in turn is
generally precipitated by emotionally and psychologically disruptive
events. 53 For many, the first few days of confinement in a public
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 41-42 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961
Senate Hearings] (testimony of A. Deutsch).
50. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961). See also 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 44.
51. GOFFMAN, supra note 50, at 14. See generally H. DUNHAM & S. WEINBERG, THE
CULTURE OF THE STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL (1960).
52. GOFFMAN, supra note 50, at 43. See also Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of
Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10,
1973) where a three-judge state court, in holding that an involuntarily-committed mental
patient may not give constitutionally sufficient consent to experimental psychosurgery,
noted that institutionalization, per se, tends to strip the mental patient of the support
which would permit him to maintain his sense of self-worth and the value of his own
physical and mental integrity. See also AcTION AGAINST MENTAL DISABILITY 34 (1970).
(The Report of the President's Task Force on the Mentally Handicapped) (concluding
that state institutions for the mentally retarded are "a national disgrace").
53. See 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 185-86 (testimony of Hugh A.
Ross); id. at 132 (testimony of Hon. John Biggs, Jr.).
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mental institution establish a foundation for the self-fulfillment of
the mental illness prophecy.54
The picture of the public mental institution painted by Goffman
and others55 has, in the last three decades, helped focus attention on
the general failure of the institution as the cornerstone of formal
American social policy toward the mentally ill. Perhaps one of the
most striking indicia of the general bankruptcy of mental institutional
life can be found in data indicating that there is a shocking disparity
between public mental institution death rates and death rates for the
general population. Several studies have shown that mortality rates
among the hospitalized mentally ill are considerably in excess of those
of corresponding age groups in the general population.56 For example,
in 1966 death rates for mental patients ranged from 1.3 times that
of the general population in New Mexico to 16.6 times that of the
general population in Arizona. The average national mortality rate
for mental patients in that year was greater than 7.5 times that for
the general population, and only two states showed a lower rate for
their mental patients. 57 While the incredibly high institutional death
rates may not prove conclusively that mental institutions inevitably
hasten their patients' deaths, they certainly present unavoidable
evidence of the fact that confinement in such institutions tends to
cause deprivations which create a substantial risk of premature death
to which the general population is not subjected.58 It is possible, of
course, that these statistics may reflect the fact that people of ad-
vanced age constitute a substantial proportion of involuntarily-
54. See T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 11-17 (1963); Larson, The Positive
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, Dec. 15, 1965 (unpublished paper presented to the National
Institute of Mental Health).
55. See generally R. BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (2d ed. 1966); BELKNAP, supra
note 45; A. DEUrSCH, THE SHAME OF TH4E STATES (1948); D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND
THE INSTITUTIONAL CAREER (1966). See also Hearings on H.R. 3688, 3689 & 2567 Before
the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963).
56. See, e.g., BRAKEL: ROCK, supra note 2, at 134 (stating that death accounted for
about 7% of the separations from institutions for the mentally ill in 1969);
M. KRAMER, E. POLLACK, R. REDICK & B. LOCKE, MENTAL DISORDERS/SuICIDE 8 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as KRAMER, et al.]. For more current figures, see Biometry Branch, Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 77 (1973). See also McGarry, Demon-
stration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental Illness: Review and Pre-
view, 49 BOSTON U.L. REV. 46, 56 (1969) (showing that a group of patients committed to
a large maximum security state hospital for treatment left the hospital by death more
often than by all other avenues of release).
57. National Institute of Mental Health, Provisional Patient Movement and Ad-
ministrative Data, State and County Mental Hospitals (1966).
58. See generally Furman & Conners, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process,
8 DuQ. L. REv. 32, 45-47 (1969-70).
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committed patients. 5 But it is likely that these figures can be more
closely correlated with the fact that many public mental institutions
are overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary, 0 and that the ratio of
physicians to patients generally has been much lower in the mental
hospital than in the general population.61 In a very real sense, confine-
ment in most state mental institutions increases the patient's risk of
death or serious illness by combining a dangerous and destructive
physical environment with significantly reduced access to adequate
medical attention. 62
B. The Public Mental Institution: Therapy or Anti-Therapy?
In recent years, the increased publicization of the inhumane
psychological and physical environment prevailing in many public
mental institutions has substantially affected public attitudes toward
the American mental health system and the medical and mental
59. At the time of the filing of suit in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the district
court found that Alabama's Bryce Hospital had approximately 5,000 inmates, 1,500
to 1,600 of whom were geriatrics. 325 F. Supp. at 782, 784.
60. For a description of conditions prevailing in several mental institutions, see A.
DEurSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948). See also H.R. REP. No. 694, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9, 11 (1963), where, in reference to the Mental Retardation Facilities and Com-
munity Health Centers Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 290 (1963), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681-
87 (1970), it was noted that almost 20% of the then existing state mental institutions were
fire and health hazards by the standards of their own states, and that most residential
facilities for the mentally retarded were obsolete and overcrowded.
61. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Here, the court
noted that Wisconsin, in 1965, had one physician for each 175 public mental patients,
placing that state 46th among the 50 states in patient-physician ratios. These figures
compare with the minimum standards for staff-patient ratios set by the American
Psychiatric Association, which recommended a minimum of one physician for every 30
inmates requiring admission or intensive treatment services, and one physician for every
150 inmates on continued treatment services. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS
FOE HOSPITALS AND CLINICS (1956). Even these recommended physician-patient ratios
are probably very conservative, representing a "compromise between what was thought
to be adequate and what it was thought had some possibility of being realized." Solomon,
The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American Psychiatry, 115 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (1958). See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. 1974),
where, in affirming that part of the district court's decision finding a constitutional
right to treatment for the involuntarily-committed mental patient, the court approved the
district court's findings concerning the woeful inadequacy of medical treatment, noting
that at the time of initiation of the suit, there were ratios of only one medical doctor
with some psychiatric training for 5,000 patients in Partlow State Hospital.
62. Furman & Conners, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8 DuQ. L.
REV. 32, 48-49 (1969-70).
It should also be noted that the large, open wards of many institutions frequently
are not segregated in terms of the potential or actual violence of patients commingled
therein. Consequently, patients who are passive and non-aggressive may find themselves
exposed to physical intimidation or injury from more violent patients.
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health establishment. Sociologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists who
have been involved in the mental institutional system are fast reach-
ing a consensus that confinement in the traditional public mental
hospital is antitherapeutic, especially in the case of long-term and
indefinite commitment. The writings of Deutsch 63  and others
graphically portray the public mental institution as a cold, isolated,
dangerous place which fosters depersonalization, dependency, isola-
tion, dehumanization and misery, and which inevitably causes the
breakdown of many socially-valued behavioral characteristics and
patterns acquired prior to the patients' admission.6 4 The existence of
this degenerative or regressive aspect of the public mental institution
has been implicitly recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in Jackson v. Indiana6 5 where the rationale for commitment to a
mental institution in the pretrial criminal setting was questioned in
view of available empirical data concerning the state of most
American mental institutions.
The anti-therapeutic effect of long-term hospitalization 66 has been
63. A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF TIlE STATES (1948).
64. It should be noted that freedom itself has been regarded as a therapeutic tool.
As Deutsch noted in 1961, after describing the miserable conditions existing in a
typical mental hospital ward:
This is in spite of the overwhelming evidence, not only abroad but now in
this country, that loss of liberty harms the mental patient and is unnecessary
for public safety. Indeed, it has been amply demonstrated that freedom is a
therapeutic tool [and] that it speeds recovery ....
1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 45 (testimony of A. Deutsch).
In this context, testimony of Dr. Gunnar Dybawd, Professor of Human Development
at the Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare at Brandeis University,
in the case of Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afJ'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), is informative. In describing the
profoundly dehumanizing effects of confinement of residents at Partlow hospital, Dr.
Dybawd stated:
"I think if you walk through Partlow, you can see it; you can see the effect-the
people who begin to become involved in eccentric mannerisms, the rocking back
and forth, peculiar behavior mechanisms, the people who sit in a semi-stupor in a
place, without any activity, the people who slowly deteriorate and turn to the
simple elements of human behavior. . . . In other words, it is a deterioration. I
would further now add to this from my own observations, but not at Partlow
that we have ample documentation in this country that individuals who come to
institutions and can walk stop walking, who come to institutions and can talk will
stop talking, and can feed themselves will stop feeding themselves; in other words,
in many other ways, a steady process of deterioration."
Brief of Amici Curiae at 33, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. 406 U.S. 715, 735 (1972).
66. As of the end of 1962, the median length of stay for all public mental hospital
residents was 8.4 years, while the median length of stay for schizophrenics, the largest
single group of mental patients, was 12.8 years. KRAMER, et al., supra note 56, at 27.
Kramer, et al., attribute the accumulation of these patients, particularly the schizo-
phrenics, to a combination of the severity of their illness and the depersonalizing
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the subject of many studies. One such study concluded that the social
processes and structures of a typical "chronic" ward worked in opposi-
tion to the goal of treatment.6 7 The debilitating effects of prolonged
institutionalization have been recognized as potentially insurmount-
able obstacles to the stabilization or improvement of schizophrenics. 61
Common utilization of such techniques as the privilege system, whereby
every action or omission of the patient carries the potential of sanc-
tion or reward, although usually designed to achieve positive behavior
modification, frequently results in the suppression of the very prob-
lems that led to commitment.69 Consequently, even the most ambitious
forms of therapy may have little positive effect. Research evidence and
clinical experience, using relatively objective measurements and in-
dependent criteria of functioning have persuasively demonstrated that
the negative, anti-therapeutic effects of institutionalization often
counteract processes of natural or induced remission in mental disfunc-
tion, thus producing more psychologic harm than good.7" Moreover,
effects of long-term institutionalization, per se. They cite such factors as inadequate
treatment and rehabilitation programs, lack of psychological stimulation, insufficient
staff, and insufficient community resources to bridge the gap between hospital and
community. Id. at 28-29.
Retention figures have changed drastically in the last 10 years. In 1971, only
slightly over 10% of patients admitted during that year to state and county mental
hospitals were retained continuously for over 6 months. Biometry Branch, National
Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 74, at 2 (1973). This sharp decrease in
long-term commitment has generally been attributed to increased use of chemotherapy
in treatment, increased recognition of the damaging effects of long-term confinement,
increased public and professional pressure for the "communitization" of mental health
services, and the increased administrative pressure to reduce inpatient cases for financial
reasons.
67. Kantor & Gelineau, Making Chronic Schizophrenics, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 54
(1969). See also Pittman, Langsley, Kaplan, Flomenhaft, & DeYoung, Family Therapy
as an Alternative to Psychiatric Hospitalization, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, PSYCHIATRIC
REPORT No. 20, at 188 (1966).
68. A. FRAzIER & S. CARR, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 124 (1964). See generally
DUNHAM & WEINBERG, supra note 51, at 244 ("prolonged hospitalization .... operates ad-
versely on patients with a functional disorder."); Bloomberg, A Proposal for a Community-
Based Hospital as a Branch of a State Hospital, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 814 (1960) ("There is
repetitive evidence that once a patient has remained in a large mental hospital for
two years or more, he is quite unlikely to leave except by death."); Klerman, Current
Evaluation Research on Mental Health Services, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 783, 784 (1974)
("Within the mental health professions, there is a general awareness that large mental
hospitals too easily become professionally and therapeutically bankrupt.").
69. Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13
SANTA CLARA LAW. 447, 458-63 (1973). See also Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior
Modification, Token Economies, and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973).
70. See Penn, Sindberg & Roberts, The Dilemma of Involuntary Commitment:
Suggestions for a Measurable Alternative, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 4 (1969), and articles
cited therein. See generally Gralnick & Duncan, Problems of the Patient in Transit from
Hospital to Community, MENTAL PATIENTS IN TRANSITION (1961).
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the psychologically degenerative characteristics of mental institution-
alization become evident in even the short-term patient,7 although
the degree of institutionalization, dependency, and deterioration is
probably closely related to the amount of time spent in confinement."'
The anti-therapeutic effect of confinement in public mental hos-
pitals becomes even more apparent when consideration is accorded
the fact that many past and present patients are untreatable, and
that many others cannot benefit from any further treatment that
can be offered by the hospital.73 In this regard, one study has
noted that out of some 200,000 schizophrenic patients hospitalized for
longer than 1 year in public mental hospitals, estimates of those
71. The mere diagnosis of mental illness prerequisite to indefinite, involuntary
commitment, can have a harmful effect on the mental patient, encouraging him to
enter into a "sick role." T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 117-21 (1966). See also
GOFFMAN, supra note 50, at 355-56; D. MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY
63 (1969).
For general discussion in support of the proposition that the designation of mental
illness, per se, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, see T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERrY, AND PSY-
CHIATRY 11-17 (1963); T. SZASZ, Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Crime Against
Humanity, Aug. 4, 1967 (unpublished paper presented in part at the International and
Comparative Conference on Mental Illness and the State, Northwestern University School
of Law, Chicago, Illinois, in Harvard Law School Library).
72. Several studies have shown that the longer a mental patient is confined, the
less likely are his chances for release. See, e.g., Duran & Errion, Perpetuation of Chronicity
in Mental Illness, 70 AM. J. Nus. 1707 (1970); KRAMER, et al., supra note 56, at 27-28.
See also Biometry Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 66 (1972).
Although there appear to be few studies relative to the maximum period of institu-
tionalization that can be expected to be constructive before the point of "psychologic
diminishing returns" is reached, one study claimed that between 75% and 85% of
newly admitted and readmitted patients should be released within 3 months, with
the optimum average length of stay being 28 to 32 days. The consequences of failing
to meet these goals were said to be:
Unless units come close to reaching those figures, staff attitudes and programs
should well become suspect.
Close confinement is antibiologic and unhuman [sic]. The person confined has a
choice of two responses-to vigorously attack or to passively withdraw.
Hecker, The Demise of Large State Hospitals, 21 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 261,
262 (1970). See also Mendel, Effect of Length of Hospitalization on Rate and Quality of
Remission from Acute Psychotic Episodes, 143 J. NaRv. & MENT. DISEASE 226 (1966).
73. A common example of the "untreatable" confined at state mental hospitals are
the elderly, who suffer from senility or hardening of the arteries. In testimony before
a Senate subcommittee, Dr. Cameron. then superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital
in Washington, D.C., agreed that, for many of these persons, treatment consists largely
of seeing that they have adequate food and that they are assisted in keeping clean, etc.
Hearings on S. 935 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 151 (1963). See also Twerski, Treating the
Untreatable: A Critique of the Proposed Right to Treatment Law, 22 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 261 (1971).
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not requiring care run as high as 40 percent.7' For these patients
especially, pathological behavior developing after a long period of
confinement can usually be attributed to the hospital experience rather
than to a manifestation of a preexisting mental illness.75 Moreover,
the dependency fostered by institutional life and the severing of ties
with family and friends that frequently results from confinement in
the usually remote and isolated mental hospital act to reduce prospects
for discharge and ultimate return to the community. 76
A broader perception of the overwhelmingly detrimental impact
of commitment to the public mental hospital can be obtained from
statistics showing the extremely high rate of rehospitalization of former
mental patients. In 1969, for example, 69 percent of all admitted
patients diagnosed as schizophrenic 77 had previously received state
hospital care. 78 Almost one-half of the total admissions for that year
had had previous episodes of care in a state mental hospital, the ma-
jority of these episodes having occurred within the previous 12
months.79 These high readmission rates have not been, and perhaps
cannot be, exclusively attributed to any one factor. Conceivably, the
increased reliance on psychotropic drugs as a treatment modality"
may increase readmission as a result of rapid relapse when the drugs
are discontinued after the patient's release."' Similarly, administrative
and medical pressures toward reducing overcrowding may result in
74. Hogarty, The Plight of Schizophrenics in Modern Treatment Programs, 22
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 197 (1971). This study, and others cited therein, estimate
that the number of schizophrenic patients capable of fully independent living ranges
from 3.5% to 17%. Id. at 202.
75. See Ozarin, Moral Treatment and the Mental Hospital, 111 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
371 (1955).
76. Langsley, Flomenhaft, & Machotka, Followup Evaluation of Family Crisis Therapy,
39 Am. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 753, 759 (1969).
77. Schizophrenia is the most common diagnosis for persons admitted to public
mental hospitals. See generally Biometry Branch, National Institute of Mental Health,
Statistical Note 39 (1971).
78. Id.
79. Biometry Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 53 (1971).
An episode of inpatient care is defined as treatment in the inpatient service which is
begun by admission directly to that service.
80. Chemotherapy, as a treatment modality in the public mental institution, was
introduced on a significant scale in the mid-1950's. During a brief period, four new
types of drugs were introduced into therapeutic practice-chlorpromazine, rauwolfia,
mebrobamate, and imipramine. Psychotropic drugs, which influence the mind and alter
behavior, mood, and mental functioning, effected major changes in the policies of
mental hospitals. Cf. Klerman, Psychotropic Drugs as Therapeutic Agents, 9 Lstx r
SCIENTIA 110 (1972). See generally BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 160; Claghorn &
Kinross-Wright, Reduction in Hospitalization of Schizophrenics, 128 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 344
(1971).
81. Claghorn & Kinross-Wright, supra note 80.
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release of some patients before they are able to take full advantage
of whatever therapeutic services the institution can offer.8 2 However,
in view of the overwhelming evidence of the detrimental effect of
public mental hospital confinement, there would appear to be a sub-
stantial causal relationship between the experience of an initial com-
mitment and the likelihood of subsequent hospitalization.
In considering the overall impact of civil commitment on the
mental patient, it is essential to understand the pervasive social stigma-
tization attendant thereto.83 This stigmatization has the combined
effect of altering society's perception of the mental patient, and alter-
ing his perception of himself.84 Although many psychiatrists still ap-
proach mental illness from the perspective of the "medical model," '85
most of society does not. 6 And while any formal labeling of "mental
illness" frequently leads to public attitudes of suspicion, fear, hostility,
and even ostracism, the fact of confinement in an asylum, often re-
ferred to as a "nut house," compounds these feelings vis-a-vis the mental
82. With the recent trend toward phasing out the large state hospital, many
chronic patients have been transferred to other extended care facilities or have been
discharged into communities which too frequently have few, if any, aftercare or transi-
tional services or facilities. As a result, many of these patients are unable to cope
with the pressures of unassisted, non-institutional life, and are ultimately driven back
to the mental hospital. See generally Klerman, supra note 68.
83. See generally B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIA-
TRISTS AND THE LAW 145-78 (1972); E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA 5, 41-104 (1963); Aviram &
Segal, Exclusion of the Mentally Ill, Reflection on an Old Problem in a New Context,
29 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 126 (1973); Bentz & Edgerton, The Consequences of Labeling
a Person as Mentally Ill, 6 Soc. PSYCHIARY 29 (1971); Phillips, Identification of Mental
Illness: Its Consequences for Rejection, 3 COMMUNITY MENT. HEALTH J. 262 (1967); Sarbin &
Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward Mental Illness,
35 J. CONSUL. & CGUN. PsYcIoL. 159 (1970). See also Crocetti, Spiro & Siassi, Are the Ranks
Closed? Attitudinal Social Distance and Mental Illness, 127 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1121 (1971),
and articles cited therein.
84. The altering of self-perception frequently plays an integral role in the in-
dividual's development of barriers that tend to inhibit his ability to benefit from any
therapeutic programs offered by the institution. In this respect, it has been observed
that:
In response to his stigmatization and to the sensed deprivation that occurs
when he enters the hospital, the inmate frequently develops some alienation from
civil society, sometimes expressed by an unwillingness to leave the hospital. This
alienation can develop regardless of the type of disorder for which the patient
was committed, constituting a side effect of hospitalization that frequently has more
significance for the patient and his personal circle than do his original difficulties.
E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 355-56 (1961).
85. See Klerman, Clinical Relevance of Recent Research on Schizophrenia for Treat-
ment and Prevention, Feb. 7, 1975 (unpublished paper presented at "Symposium on
Perspectives in Biology and Psychiatry," at the American College of Psychiatrists,
Phoenix, Arizona).
86. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and cases and text cited
therein.
THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
patient. By definition, involuntary commitment is an accusation of
mental illness which is seen as analogous to being accused of a wrong-
doing or a crime, 87 and mental institutions are viewed as places to
send "crazy people," where they can be kept with "their own kind."
The stigmatization attached to involuntary commitment of the
mentally ill is manifested in many ways. 8  In many jurisdictions, in-
voluntary commitment has the effect of rendering the patient civilly
incompetent, either by virtue of explicit statutory mandate, 89 by the
exercise of the committing judge's discretion," or by the exercise of
a hospital superintendent's discretion. 1 The diagnosis of mental dis-
ability and resultant commitment to a mental institution may provide
a predicate for judicial termination of parental rights, such as the right
of the biological parent to withhold consent in adoption proceedings
involving his or her children.9 2 Similarly, involuntary commitment can
result in placement of the mental patient's children in foster homes
or with public agencies, and can affect the committed person's legal
capacity to marry.93 Although a few states specifically provide that
commitment to a public mental institution shall not by itself adversely
affect the patient's civil rights, 94 many states have provided that com-
mitment to a mental institution-or other formal declaration of in-
sanity-can create civil disabilities ranging from the legal inability to
contract, make a will, and vote, to inability to obtain professional,
business and drivers' licenses. 95
87. Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally 111, 9 CLEV. 'IAR. L. REV. 399, 401 (1960).
88. See generally ROCK, JACOBSON & JANOPAUL, supra note 18, at 242-52.
89. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-119 (1973). See also OIuro REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.15 (Page 1970). But see Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974), re-
quiring that no person shall be deemed incompetent soley by reason of his commitment
or admission to a mental hospital.
90. E.g., MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1469 (1975). For general discussion of
differing statutory approaches to involuntary commitment and its relationship to com-
petency, see BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 250, 273-78.
91. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.150(a) (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-15 A(3) (Supp.
1975).
92. See generally BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 234-38; 248-59; Table 7.3.
93. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 551.6 (1967).
94. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334-57 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.460 (1975).
95. For a comprehensive discussion of the civil disabilities attendant to a declara-
tion of insanity and commitment to a mental institution, and for a survey of state
statutes affecting the civil rights of the mentally ill, see BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2,
at 303-40. See also H.L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND RFSPONSIBIu-Ty 29 (1968); Note,
Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1119
(1966).
In a recent case illustrating the discriminatory treatment given by states to former
mental patients, a federal district court held constitutional against an equal protection
challenge a North Carolina law that requires every licensed driver who has been
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Many of the civil disabilities attendant to a declaration of mental
illness are directly traceable to the commitment process itself. But
this stigmatization is only part of the burden imposed on the life of
the mental patient, much of which is not felt until release or dis-
charge from the institution. In many cases, the informal rejection of
the discharged mental patient is felt more deeply, making an unassisted
adjustment into the community difficult or impossible. Perhaps
the most conspicuous of these hardships appears in the area of em-
ployment. Of course, the initial involuntary commitment acts in
most cases to make it physically impossible for mental patients to
continue in their employment, trade or profession. Upon release, how-
ever, former mental patients are generally confronted with formidable
obstacles to finding jobs,96 a problem magnified by the relative lack
of education and job-marketability generally characteristic of public
mental patients. 91
Aside from employment problems, the former mental patient is
frequently faced with physical exclusion from many communities,
either through utilization of formal procedures, such as exclusionary
zoning,98 or more informal procedures that result in "ghettoization." 99
This latter phenomenon results from a de facto exclusion of released,
indigent, mental patients from specific neighborhoods, largely as a
result of the low level of public assistance and meager rental markets
involuntarily committed for mental illness, alcoholism, or drug addiction to submit to
special scrutiny and possible loss of license because of the special threat they had been
deemed to pose by the state to highway safety. Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383
(M.D.N.C. 1974).
96. As one noted expert in the area of the rights and problems of the mentally ill
has said: "Former mental patients do not get jobs. In the job market, it is better to
be an ex-felon than ex-patient." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 284 (1970) (pre-
pared statement of Bruce J. Ennis) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]. See also
In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); ACTION FOR MENTAL
HEALTH (Report of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health) 56 (1961); But
see Landy & Griffith, Employer Receptivity Toward Hiring Psychiatric Patients, 42
MENTAL HYGIENE 383 (1958).
97. Cf. Biometry Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Statistical Note 104,
at 2 (1974) (showing inverse relationship between level of education attained and rate
of admission, with the age adjusted admission rate of patients with 0-7 years of educa-
tion being six times greater than that of patients at the college level). See generally
MY.RS & BEAN, supra note 46.
98. See Friedman, Analysis of the Principal Issues and Strategies in Zoning Exclusion
Cases, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1093 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman
eds. 1973). Cf. Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding unconstitutional
a municipal ordinance which prohibited the registration, in local hotels and boarding
houses, of those who required continuous medical or psychiatric services).
99. Aviram & Segal, supra note 83.
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available to them, and the tendency of many of these people to find
themselves confined to socially and economically marginal neighbor-
hoods.100 Moreover, the released mental patient is frequently faced
with more subtle, yet equally debilitative manifestations of pervasive
distrust, fear, and general social disapprobation.101
The social stigmatization associated with formal declarations of
mental illness and commitment to a public mental hospital can, and
frequently does, place an insurmountable barrier to the unassisted re-
integration of the mental patient into the community, and frequently
leads to rehospitalization.11 2 This is especially true where there is in-
adequate preleave planning and where there are inadequate transi-
tional or aftercare services in the community. Ambitious programs
of public education about mental illness and the deinstitutionaliza-
tion of mental health systems might substantially reduce public fear
of mental institutions and mental patients. Until such time, the
stigmatization traditionally attached to the mental patient will con-
tinue to add to the hardship and deprivation occasioned by involuntary
civil commitment. 10 3
V. THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT AND THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
A. Judicial Development of the Right to Treatment
The plight of the public mental patient went almost unnoticed by
the general public and the courts until comparatively recent years.1 0 4
Although there has been significant attention focused on the procedures
by which a person is involuntarily committed to a mental hospital, 10 5
100. Id. at 129-30.
101. Some studies have described the significant rejection and stigmatization the
former mental patient is frequently subjected to by his own family. Although this
rejection may have begun prior to hospitalization, and in some cases may have partially
precipitated commitment procedures, it is frequently compounded by a fear that mental
institutional life has effected an aggravation of pre-existing mental instability. See, e.g.,
Drieman & Minard, Preleave Planning: Effect Upon Rehospitalization, ARCHiVrs GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 87 (1971); Gove & Fain, The Stigma of Mental Hospitalization: An Attempt
to Evaluate Its Consequences, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 494 (1973).
102. Gove & Fain, supra note 101.
103. The stigmatization suffered by the public mental patient is a deprivation of
liberty which has been held to reach constitutional proportions. Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See
also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remand-
ed, 421 U.S. 957 (1975). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stigma of unwed
motherhood); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (stigma created by
state termination of employment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (stigma resulting from prosecution for addiction).
104. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972), the Court noted that the
lack of attention given to the rights of persons civilly committed was surprising.
105. See, e.g., Curran, supra note 4; Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
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only in the last 15 years have the courts and the scholarly litera-
ture begun to address the rights of mental patients once commitment
has been effected.1°6 The various in-institution civil rights residing in
mental patients have been brought within the general umbrella of
the "right to treatment."'' 7
The first major case dealing with the right to treatment was
Rouse v. Cameron'5 5 where the court, in reversing and remanding the
district court's denial of an involuntarily-committed mental patient's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, held that right to treatment existed
by virtue of the language of the commitment statute. In dicta, how-
ever, the court observed that civil commitment without treatment
would raise "considerable constitutional problems"'0 9 under the due
process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses
of the federal constitution. This reference to a potential constitutional
source for the right to treatment formed the starting point for subse-
quent judicial analysis of the nature and extent of the obligation owed
by the states to their involuntarily-committed mental patients. Since
the Rouse decision, several courts have extrapolated the right to treat-
ment from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 110
14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822 (1967); Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for
Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1967); Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 668 (1959).
106. The seminal article in the area of the right to treatment is Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). Since this article, there has been a flood of
literature addressing the rights of mental patients in the institution. See, e.g., ENNIS &
SIEGEL, supra note 18; LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED (B. Ennis & P.
Friedman eds. 1973) (three volume set); Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Re-
sponsibility of the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 680 (1969); Ferleger, supra note 69. See also works
cited in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. See A Symposium: The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969). It
should be noted that the analogous principle in the area of the institutionalized mentally
retarded has been called the "right to habilitation," involving "such individual habilita-
tion as will give each [patient] a realistic opportunity to lead a more useful and
meaningful life and to return to society." Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th
Cir. 1974), quoting, Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
108. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
109. Id. at 453.
110. E.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974);
Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afJ'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 233 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1968).
But see New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (rejecting the notion of a due process based right to treat-
ment); Burnham v. Dep't of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd,
503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975) (in which the district
court held that no constitutional right to treatment existed).
The right to treatment has also been applied in analogous cases. See, e.g., Martarella
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The constitutional right to treatment, implicitly recognized in
Rouse and almost unanimously recognized in its progeny, is based
on an evaluation of the state's interest in confining a mentally ill person
vis-a-vis the individual's interests which are adversely affected by mental
institutionalization. In assessing the burdens and deprivations as-
sociated with civil commitment, the courts have noted that the im-
positions on personal freedoms created by confinement are substantially
equivalent to those of convicted felons incarcerated in peniten-
tiaries."' Indeed, the deprivation could prove to be greater in view
of the purely custodial approach of many mental hospitals, the
possibility of indefinite confinement, and the often greater stigmatiza-
tion associated with mental hospital confinement."' While it is argu-
able that humane incarceration without affirmative treatment or re-
habilitation is justifiable for convicted felons,1 3 the civil commitment
of the mentally ill has been viewed much differently.
The judicial analysis of the right to treatment has proceeded by
closely scrutinizing the state's goals in civil commitment and by ques-
tioning whether these goals are weighty enough to justify the massive
personal infringements thereby created. In Donaldson v. O'Connor,'1
the purpose of civil commitment legislation was perceived as being
based in two areas. The first, falling within the state's "police powers,"
was protection against the mentally ill individual's potential danger
to himself or his danger to others. 15 The second area of the state's
v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (non-delinquent
juvenile in need of supervision); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp.
1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (juvenile delinquents). Cf. Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd sub norn. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
111. See Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., con-
curring) (noting that mandatory commitment of one acquitted by reason of a criminal
defense of insanity, where not reasonably circumscribed, would "transform the hospital
into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense.").
112. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The deprivations of freedom associated with civil
commitment are clearly within the "liberty" interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
113. But see James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (preliminary
order), in which state prisoners allege deprivation of a constitutional right to treat-
ment and rehabilitation. The court overruled defendants' motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), where the district court stated that "[t]he absence of an
affirmative program of training and rehabilitation may have constitutional significance
where in the absence of such a program conditions and practices exist which actually
militate against reform and rehabilitation." Contra, Smith v. Schneckloth, 414 F.2d 680
(9th Cir. 1969).
114. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
115. 493 F.2d 507, 520 (1974).
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concern, falling within the state's parens patriae"1 6 power, was the pro-
vision of care or treatment to the individual who was perceived as
being unable to care for himself.117 Pursuant to the "police powers"
rationale, the court of appeals in Donaldson viewed the state's power
to deprive an individual of his liberty as being generally conditioned
on his having committed an act previously defined as a crime, and
the individual's having been provided with the opportunity-in the
form of a criminal trial-to contest the allegations made against him.11 8
Similarly, where civil commitment was effected under the parens
patriae rationale, the due process clause was interpreted as requiring
that minimally adequate treatment in fact be provided.? 9
The court of appeals in Donaldson reasoned that traditional due
process safeguards had not been applied to the appellee, who had not
been committed to the Florida mental hospital for the commission of
a criminal act, and who had not been afforded the due process
procedural safeguards ordinarily associated with a criminal proceed-
ing.120 Accordingly, the court held that the state must provide a quid
For a general discussion of the commitment of the mentally ill pursuant to the
state's police power, see Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
IIl, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1222-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
116. For general discussion concerning the development of the parens patriae doctrine,
see Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822, 824, 828 (1967).
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
117. 493 F.2d 507, 520 (1974).
118. Id. at 521-22. The court also viewed commitment of a "dangerous" individual
under the police powers rationale as being controlled by three limiting factors, including
rehabilitation for a specific offense, detention for a fixed term, and commitment pur-
suant to procedures accompanied by fundamental safeguards. Id. at 522. Cf. Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968).
119. The court of appeals in Donaldson relied heavily upon the language of the
Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), where the Court "es-
tablished the rule that '[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which the individual
is committed.'" 493 F.2d 507, 521. Although Jackson involved the pretrial commitment
of a criminal defendant found incompetent to stand trial, the Supreme Court's reasoning
would seem to apply equally to a civilly-committed individual who is confined for the
purposes of care or treatment. Cf. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S.
355 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Humphrey
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
This view is substantially reinforced by language in the most recent Supreme Court
case dealing with the rights of public mental patients, where the Court stated in
dictum:
Nor is it enough that Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a consti-
tutionally adequate basis . . . because even if his involuntary confinement was
initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no
longer existed.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975).
120. Indeed, this is true for most states' civil commitment schemes. See BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 2, at 38-58; Ennis & Litwa*c, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Ex-
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pro quo,12 1 in the form of rehabilitative treatment, to justify confine-
ment.1 22 This right was further refined to include "such treatment
as will help him to be cured or to improve his mental condition.' ' 2 3
B. O'Connor v. Donaldson: An Exercise in the Passive Virtues?124
The United States Supreme Court, in agreeing to review the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Donaldson v. O'Connor, was presented with
the opportunity to finally resolve the issue of whether due process
guaranteed the nondangerous civilly-committed public mental patient
a right to treatment.' 2 5 The Court's opinion,'12 however, does not ex-
pertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 743-47 (1974). See
also Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974).
121. In this context the quid pro quo requirement found one of its earliest ex-
pressions in footnote 30 of the Supreme Court's opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22
(1967), where the Court noted:
While we are concerned only with procedure before the juvenile court in this
case, it should be noted that to the extent that the special procedures for juveniles
are thought to be justified by the special consideration and treatment afforded
them, there is reason to doubt that juveniles always receive the benefits of such
a quid pro quo.
Interestingly, the Court subsequently cited Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1967), and Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966), both cases involving
civilly-committed mental patients.
122. 493 F.2d at 520-27. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Com-
monwealth v. Page, 159 N.E.2d 82 (Mass. 1959).
123. 493 F.2d at 527. Although the holding of the court of appeals in Donaldson
was limited in application to a nondangerous, involuntarily civilly-committed patient,
the scope of the court's analysis would logically compel the applicability of the right
to treatment where commitment has been effected pursuant to the "police powers"
rationale. Cf. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (criminal sexual
psychopath). See generally Developments, supra note 115, at 1236-45.
124. The "passive virtues," in Professor Bickel's terms, describe various devices
and techniques of "not doing," devices to which he contended the Supreme Court fre-
quently resorts for disposing of a case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional
issue the case raises. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962). Although
a comprehensive analysis of the validity or applicability of Professor Bickel's theory in
the context of the Court's approach to the right-to-treatment issue is outside this article's
scope, the issues raised by his ideas permeate the Court's opinion in O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
125. Petitioner O'Connor, at the time suit was filed in the district court, was the
superintendent of the Florida State Hospital where Donaldson had been confined from
January 1957, until his release in July 1971. In his brief before the United States
Supreme Court, O'Connor's statement of questions presented included "Whether there is
a constitutional right to treatment for persons involuntarily committed to a state
mental hospital." Brief for Petitioner at 2, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association, as amicus curiae, extensively briefed
the fourteenth amendment right to treatment issue. Respondent Donaldson, however,
did not phrase the question presented in pure right to treatment terms. Instead, respon-
dent couched the issue in narrower terms, asking the Court to decide whether one "who
was involuntarily confined to a mental hospital for the purpose of treatment . . . and
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pressly decide the right to treatment issue, although it provides
significant indications of the view the Court might adopt in a case
in which it sees the issue directly presented. Moreover, the Court
provides at least preliminary indications of its thinking on several
related issues which have potential for substantial impact on the rights
of public mental patients.
1 27
The most direct and fundamental holding in Donaldson deals
with the right to liberty instead of the right to treatment. Mr. Justice
Stewart, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional
law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this
case in its present posture .... As we view it, this case raises a single,
relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning
every man's constitutional right to liberty. 128
The Court went on to hold:
In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more
a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends . 29
In so holding, the Court attempted to make explicit what it was
not deciding. Accordingly, the Court stated:
[T]here is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons
dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon
compulsory confinement by the State, or whether the State may
compulsorily confine a dangerous, mentally ill individual for the
purpose of treatment. 30
who was dangerous neither to himself nor to others, [has] a constitutional right to be
restored to liberty, either by treatment or release." Brief for Respondent at 1, O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
126. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
127. The importance of the Court's opinion is especially significant in view of the
fact that the Court has decided only a few cases directly involving mental patients.
128. 422 U.S. at 573.
129. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 573.
Moreover, the Court expressly avoided deciding "whether, when, or by what pro-
cedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any grounds which,
under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement
of such a person ... " Id. at 573. For a discussion of the reasons generally advanced
for involuntary civil commitment, see section VA supra.
In this context, the Court noted that the jury found none of the traditional grounds
for continued confinement were present in Donaldson's case, and that neither party
THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
Although the Court appeared to be straining to avoid the issue
of the right to treatment, its holding should achieve the effect of the
formal construction of such a right. In essence, the Court was telling
the states that continued confinement of at least the non-dangerous
mentally ill individual, against that person's will, will result in a
violation of that person's constitutional right to liberty founded in
due process, unless treatment is provided. Although approving the
general propriety of a state's interest in providing care and assistance to
the unfortunate, the Court noted that the "mere presence of mental
illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the
comforts of an institution."'13 1 Moreover, to legitimize the intrusion
upon the harmless mentally ill's liberty, the state must demonstrate
more than the prospect that some citizens might be offended by his
presence in the community. In short, the state must do more than
contend that an involuntarily-committed person will be better off
inside a mental institution than in the community, unless being
"better off" is defined in terms of state assistance designed to eradicate
or ameliorate the characteristic triggering the state's intrusion-i.e.,
mental illness. Although Chief Justice Burger expressly disagrees,
132
and the opinion of the Court purports to reserve the issue, it seems
that the quid pro quo concept of Wyatt v. Aderholt3 3 has, at least in
principle, been tacitly endorsed by the Court.
The view that the Court, by avoiding the specific right to treat-
ment issue, was not indicating disapproval of such a right' seems
further strengthened by developments subsequent to its decision in
O'Connor. Although the Court indicated in an O'Connor footnote 3 5
that its decision vacating the judgment of the court of appeals de-
prived that court's opinion of precedential effect, it refused to exercise
the opportunity to review the Fifth Circuit's decision in Burnham v.
Department of Public Health of the State of Georgia.136 In Burnham,
the district court refused to follow those courts which had found a
objected to the jury instruction defining treatment. Consequently, the Court found "no
occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone, can
ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much or what
kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose." 422 U.S. at 574 n.10.
131. 422 U.S. at 575.
132. Id. at 586 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The quid pro quo theory is a sharp
departure from, and cannot coexist with, due process principles.").
133. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally notes 121-23 and accompanying
text supra.
134. In this context, it is important to note that the Court rejected as unpersuasive
O'Connor's contention that the sufficiency of any treatment provided is not a justiciable
question within the power of the federal courts to determine. 422 U.S. at 574 n.10.
135. Id. at 577 n.12.
136. 503 F.2d 1319 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
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constitutional right to treatment in the civilly-committed public
mental patient, and the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
on grounds relating to the eleventh amendment and the lack of a
justiciable issue.13 7 The court of appeals, in a per curiam order,13 8 re-
versed and remanded on the authority of its decision in Donaldson v.
O'Connor3 9 and Wyatt v. Aderholt.'4 0 Consequently, the Supreme
Court's action in O'Connor v. Donaldson1 41 left Wyatt v. Aderholt as
the law of the circuit. As previously discussed,'142 both the district court
and the court of appeals in Wyatt interpreted the fourteenth amend-
ment as imposing a treatment obligation upon the state. Although a
denial of certiorari should not be viewed as a decision upon the
merits,1'" it should be reasonable to assume that had the Court not
viewed favorably a constitutionally premised right to treatment, it
would have taken the opportunity to so indicate by granting review in
Burnham. It would be somewhat inconsistent to view the Court's de-
cision in O'Connor as disapproving the right to treatment in view of
the Court's almost contemporaneous bypass of an occasion to indicate
its disapproval of Wyatt, a landmark right to treatment case upon
which much of the reasoning of the court of appeals in O'Connor was
premised.'4
Viewed in the above context, and with respect to important dicta
regarding areas of vital concern to public mental patients,'4 5 the
137. Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
But see note 134 supra.
138. 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974).
139. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
140. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
141. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
142. See section VA supra.
143. See, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), denying
cert. to 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949) (opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
144. This view does not ignore the possibility that other factors may have been
operating in the Court's denial of certiorari in Burnham. One such factor may have
been the Court's conclusion that the treatment issue is a justiciable one, O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, n.10 (1975)-a conclusion previously rejected by the
district court in Burnham. A second factor may have been the Court's desire to postpone
an express ruling on the right-to-treatment issue pending an assessment of the state
and lower federal court's reactions to the O'Connor decision. In any event, the more
substantive ramification of the disposition of the Burnham case, in terms of the court's
thinking on. the right to treatment, should not be overlooked. For an illuminating dis-
cussion of the diverse factors frequently involved in the Supreme Court's decisions to
grant or deny certiorari, see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950)
(opinion of Justice Frankfurter). But see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542-43 (1953) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). See generally R. STERN & E. GRESsMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACrICE §
5.5 (4th ed. 1969).
145. In addition to the ancillary holding that the treatment issue is a justiciable
one, see note 134, supra, the Court's opinion in O'Connor clearly indicates that mental
THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
Court's holding in O'Connor gains significance beyond its purported
limitation to a narrow prohibition against involuntary confinement
"without more" of a nondangerous mentally ill individual. It is
logical to expect that state mental health officials will view O'Connor
as requiring them not only to periodically review and reevaluate con-
tinued confinement of at least the nondangerous involuntary patient,
but also as requiring them to institute meaningful treatment pro-
grams as the constitutionally-compelled price for involuntary commit-
ment.14 6 Whether this obligation is defined in terms of a right to
liberty or a right to treatment, its ramifications for the scope of
patients' rights and states' responsibilities are both similar and wide
ranging.
C. Extending the Right to Treatment Outside the Institution
The quid pro quo rationale adopted by the court of appeals in
Donaldson, and by other courts14 7 has been construed and applied
to require the creation of a humane psychological and physical en-
vironment in the mental institution, and to ensure that the institu-
tional experience, insofar as possible, is a therapeutic rather than a
purely custodial one. However, in terms of the current status of the
judicially articulated, conceptual framework for the right, there has
been no formal effort to extend its scope to a patient's postdischarge
adjustment. In fact, many early right-to-treatment cases were framed
as habeas corpus actions in which the plaintiffs sought the alternative
health personnel can be held personally liable for bad faith violations of a patient's
constitutional right to liberty. Moreover, the Court put the states on notice that they
will not be allowed to confine indefinitely an involuntary mental patient without being
able to demonstrate a continuing need for confinement. See note 119 supra.
It is also significant to note that, in rejecting a view that a state can justify locking
up a person against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confine-
ment based solely on a finding of "mental illness," the Court expressed difficulty with
the kind of precision or accuracy which could be attributed to the statutorily created
status of mental illness. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). Since the Court
felt it necessary to "assume" that "mental illness" could be given a reasonably precise and
accurate definition, the Court may have indicated its readiness to find the "mental-
illness" standard unconstitutionally vague in an appropriate case. Moreover, the Court's
treatment of the "mental-illness" standard may signal its possible discomfort with
deprivations of liberty based on mere status. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
146. In at least one state, mental health officials have already indicated that they
have read O'Connor as requiring provision of effective treatment to nondangerous in-
voluntary mental patients or, in the alternative, the patients' release. Cleveland Plain
Dealer, July 16, 1975, § B, at 10, col. 1 (dealing with the post-O'Connor discharge of
100 mental patients from Ohio's Hawthornden State Hospital).
147. See note 110 supra.
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remedies of treatment or release. 1 48 Indeed, the district court in Wyatt
v. Stickney149 found that many inmates of the state's institutions did
not suffer from mental illness and ordered them released, while fur-
ther ordering the state to provide appropriate services and assistance
to ease their return to the community. 150 The remedy ordered by the
district court required, as part of each individual's treatment plan,
that adequate transitional treatment for persons released after a period
of involuntary confinement be provided. 151 But the original opinion
in Wyatt dealt only in terms applicable to the status of the mental
patient while confined. 52 Similarly, the opinion of the court of ap-
peals is devoid of any explicit reference to a right to treatment whose
scope would reach beyond the institution to include the provision of
aftercare or transitional services to discharged mental patients.1 3 Al-
though the right to treatment fashioned by the district court judge
could and should be extended to compel the states to provide and
develop post-discharge services, the argument has apparently not yet
been articulated by the courts.14 Such an effort is made below.
It is clear that the right to treatment can have little meaning un-
less it encompasses an effective catalyst for improving the chances
for the patient to return to the community and to lead a more useful
and meaningful life. Indefinite or long-term confinement cannot be
justified simply because purely custodial care is supplemented with
an active in-hospital program of medical and psychological treatment.
148. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 768 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
149. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by
defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341, enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (1972), afJ'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. 344 F. Supp. at 373 (Order of April 13, 1972 to Bryce Hospital and Searcy
Hospital); 344 F. Supp. 387 (Order of April 13, 1972 to Partlow State School and
Hospital).
The precise reasoning of the court in ordering aftercare treatment for these patients
is not apparent in the original opinion at 325 F. Supp. 781.
151. 344 F. Supp. at 379, 384, 386 (specific reference is made to §§ 11(2), IV(26)(b),
IV(27) & (28), and IV(34), respectively, in Appendix A of the court's opinion).
152. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
153. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
154. Although Judge Johnson's preliminary orders in Wyatt, and his ultimate
formulation of individualized treatment plans clearly contemplated a right extending
into the community, the failure to develop a reasoned basis for such an extra-
institutional dimension has left its conceptual basis open to question. It is sub-
mitted that the difference between a state's obligation to provide institutional treat-
ment programs and an expanded duty to provide community based aftercare service is
a substantial one and, from a legal process perspective, ought not to be constructed
without an articulation of the nature of the underlying obligation.
THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
The purpose of the commitment must be defined in terms of assisting
the patient to overcome the prior inadequacies that made him unable
to conform to expected modes of social behavior, and the requirement
of treatment must be directed toward remedying the socio-psychological
abnormality necessitating the commitment itself. A treatment program
designed to allow the patient to adjust more easily to institutional life-
and not to create the basis for a satisfactory and permanent return to
the community-would be akin to no treatment at all. 155 Consequently,
the treatment contemplated by Rouse v. Cameron 56 and its progeny
must be measured by its effectiveness in securing an expeditious and
successful return to noninstitutional life. 157
The potential for institutionalized treatment to be truly effective
in "curing" mental illness and in providing the patient with the
means to return to the community and a permanent, more acceptable
adjustment is problematical.' One writer concluded that psycho-
therapy is no more successful in effecting a cure for mental illness
155. There is a growing awareness that "the goal of treatment is not adaptation to
continued confinement, but alleviation" or elimination of the factors leading to hospital-
ization. See, e.g., Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental Patients: Committing
the Legislature, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 965 (1974); Tucker & Maxmen, The Practice of
Hospital Psychiatry: A Formulation, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 887, 889 (1973).
Expressed in other terms, an obligation to provide treatment for the public mental
patient must be interpreted as requiring treatment which is suitable to ensuring the
patient "a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition."
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). In view of the devastating
side effects associated with large mental institutions, see, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648,
667 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Since a patient's needs may change after initial commitment,
suitable treatment may frequently require placement in an alternative facility.
156. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
157. One observer has noted that although courts and commentators frequently
use the term "adequate" in describing the requisite standard of treatment, others
have proposed the standards of "permissible," "appropriate," and "responsible." Schwitz-
gebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936, 937 (1974), and
authorities cited therein. While some exception can be taken to the narrow categoriza-
tion of effective treatment in terms of "change of patient behavior," id. at 938, it is
clear that regardless of nomenclature, treatment must produce results compatible with
the purpose of its application. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968) (where Justice
Marshall, in contrasting penal incarceration to civil commitment, said that " '[t]herapeutic
civil commitment' lacks this feature [outside statutory limit of confinement]; one is
typically committed until one is 'cured' ").
158. Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
936 (1974). After a review of literature in the area, Mr. Schwitzgebel concludes that
"the evidence for the effectiveness of traditional psychotherapeutic methods for the re-
duction of anti-social behavior is not very persuasive." Id. at 946. He does note, however,
that some of the newer forms of therapy have produced demonstrable changes in be-
havior. Id. at 947.
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than ordinary life-experience and nonspecific treatment.159 Assum-
ing, however, that some form of active psychiatric treatment can at
least serve to ameliorate symptomatic manifestations in both the acute
episodic case and the chronic patient,160 difficulties inhere in measur-
ing its effectiveness. Some suggested methods of evaluation include
examining the structure of the treatment institution, 161 the process
of treatment delivery, and the treatment outcome.'6 2 Whatever the
particular treatment modality deemed appropriate for the mental
patient while confined to the institution, it should be recognized that
the legal status of the patient-whether a voluntary or involuntary
committee-may have a large role to play in treatment outcome.
Several mental health experts have expressed the opinion that
involuntary commitment should only be permitted, if at all, for very
short periods of time. According to this view, effective treatment is
dependent upon the manner in which it is received. If it is continually
forced upon the patient, the likelihood is that he will eventually begin
to resist the therapist's efforts, thus causing an erosion of the thera-
peutic atmosphere which is considered to be a sine qua non for posi-
tive results. 1 3 Consequently, regardless of the standard used for
measuring treatment effectiveness, it may be essential that the
159. Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy, 1 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 99 (1965). See also
Zetzel, Discussions, 1 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 144 (1965).
Similar conclusions have been reached with respect to the effectiveness of therapeutic
programs in the correctional setting. See Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the
Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARv.
Civ. RIGrrs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 513 (1973), and articles cited at 522 [hereinafter cited as
Treatment Standards].
160. See Ellsworth, Reinforcement Therapy with Chronic Patients, 20 Hose. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 238 -(1969).
161. This approach would place particular emphasis on the size of the institution,
staff-patient ratios, and per capita costs. Since these factors are particularly visible and
easily provable, some courts have focused on them as persuasive indicators of the kind
of treatment being provided at mental institutions. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. See generally Treatment Standards, supra note 159, at 525-29. Cf. Katz, supra
note 14.
It would appear that the treatment-outcome approach of evaluating the effectiveness
of in-hospital treatment would provide the most objective standard. This would assume,
of course, that a comprehensive postdischarge record is kept for each patient, closely
monitoring his community adjustment and discounting the effects of placement in an
environment different from that in which the patient found himself prior to admission.
In any event, the treatment-outcome approach will be used in this discussion as the
primary standard of effectiveness.
163. See 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 445-48 (B. Ennis & P.
Friedman eds. 1973) (excerpts from the Post-Trial Memorandum on Standards of Ade-
quate Treatment for the Mentally Ill of Amici Curiae in Wyatt v. Stickney). See also
Katz, supra note 14, at 773.
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involuntarily-committed mental patient be discharged into a less co-
ercive or restrictive treatment environment within a short period after
admission4 or that he at least be converted to voluntary status.
It should be emphasized that the evaluation of treatment suggested
here does not necessarily imply that the right to treatment, as pro-
mulgated in the case law, must require that the most effective treatment
theoretically available be provided to each patient. Notwithstanding
some thorny constitutional problems inherent in that suggestion, 6 '
the ability of the psychiatric profession to develop treatment modali-
ties that can be said, with certainty, to guarantee better results
than other approaches is generally questionable. 66 Instead, effective
treatment should be defined as the least restrictive method of pro-
viding psychiatric and related services to each patient consistent with
an assurance of providing the optimum expectation of satisfactory
postinstitutional adjustment. If, in a given case, what can be done
for the patient in the mental institution itself cannot reasonably pro-
vide this assurance, constitutionally adequate treatment must include
services and assistance in the community.
In this context, it is quite clear that environmental factors per-
taining to the mental patient's preadmission social setting play a
large role in determining when and how he is ultimately committed. 167
These same factors can, in large part, be crucial in determining whether
the patient can be expected to remain in the community or whether
he is likely to become rehospitalized.6 8 If the patient is released to a
setting that predictably reduces his chances of a successful adjustment,
the discharge itself must be viewed as antitherapeutic and antithetical
to the right to treatment. Various studies have demonstrated that an
unstructured release without referral to community aftercare or transi-
tional services (such as community mental health centers, foster homes,
day-or-nightcare centers, halfway houses, group-living homes, etc.) or
164. For a discussion of the application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine
to the involuntarily committed mental patient, see section VII infra.
165. The possibility of an equal protection argument addressed to a comparison of
different treatment modalities for similar patients is raised in Treatment Standards,
supra note 159, at 524 n.73.
166. Cf. T. SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCnIATRY 24 (1963).
167. See, e.g., Simmons, Davis & Spencer, Interpersonal Strains in Release from a
Mental Hospital, 4 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 21, 26 (July, 1956).
168. Several studies have shown that art effective aftercare program substantially
increases a discharged patient's chance to adjust satisfactorily in the community. See,
e.g., R. GLASSCOTE, J. GUDEMAN & R. ELPERS, HALFWAY HOUSES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL
(1971); Drieman & Minard, supra note 101. Cf. B. PASAMANICK, F. SCARPITrI & S. DINIZ,
SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE COMMUNITY (1967); Davis, Dinitz & Pasamanick, The Prevention
of Hospitalization in Schizophrenia: Five Years After an Experimental Program, 42
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 375 (1972).
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without involvement in other community supportive agencies, will re-
sult in a predictable and substantial increase in rate of rehospitaliza-
tion.169 As one study noted:
A significant proportion of readmitted schizophrenic patients
have an impulsive and stormy life style which makes it almost im-
possible to contain them in treatment programs in which either the
patient or his family must take responsibility for keeping the
patient involved. Thus, treatment of these patients is frequently
limited to brief periods of hospitalization which control the patient's
acute psychotic episodes; little is accomplished to improve the
patient's community adjustment, and unless effective methods of
aftercare are evolved for these patients, their relapses and read-
missions are inevitable. 70
For many of these mental patients, institutional treatment programs
are limited in their potential to achieve their own goals. If treatment
was confined to in-hospital therapy, the most that could be ac-
complished for many patients would be a more stable adjustment to
the institution.
It is no doubt tautological to say that some patients will be re-
hospitalized regardless of the type of community service they ob-
tain.171 There will inevitably be chronic patients who, for reasons
of prolonged institutional dependency or otherwise, will be unable to
function satisfactorily in even the most constructive aftercare environ-
ment. But for many of these individuals, former lives of quiet des-
peration as chronic patients in public mental institutions can be
transformed into something better than a new form of community
chronicity cultivated by the neglect and antipathy of crowded nursing
homes, run-down rooming houses and other marginal residential
facilities. 172 If the right to treatment is to have any significant sub-
169. See, e.g., H. FREEMAN & 0. SIMMONS, THE MENTAL PATIENT COMES HOME (1963);
Zolik, Lantz & Sommers, Hospital Return Rates and Pre-release Referrals, 18 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 712 (1968).
170. Raskin & Dyson, Treatment Problems Leading to Readmissions of Schizophrenic
Patients, 19 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 356, 359 (1968).
171. It is also quite probable that some former patients can reside in the community
while actively psychotic and socially withdrawn, even without the stabilizing effect
of placement in a positive family environment or in the structured or semi-structured
atmosphere of aftercare facilities. In this regard, some discharged patients are able to
avoid rehospitalization when their interpersonal performance is within the range of
behaviors expected by those with whom they interact. See, e.g., Freeman & Simmons,
Mental Patients in the Community: Family Settings and Performance Levels, 23 AM.
SOClOL. REV. 147 (1958).
172. Cf. Klerman, supra note 80, at 126.
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stance for these patients, it must include the preparation of an after-
care program that will provide at least the potential for a useful and
meaningful existence in the community. If, because of failure to
develop postdischarge planning or lack of viable aftercare alternatives,
release from the mental hospital merely accomplishes a transfer from
a back ward to a back alley, the right to treatment will be an empty
promise indeed.13
The importance of predischarge planning and the development
of aftercare services as a component of the right to treatment has be-
come increasingly clear in view of the present emphasis on shorter
periods of hospitalization for new patients and the trend in some states
toward often precipitous release of chronic mental patients. Several
recent studies have described a movement by public mental hospitals
toward the unstructured dumping of mental patients into communi-
ties that are unprepared to offer the services and facilities necessary
to assure a reasonable opportunity for continued treatment and satis-
factory community adjustment. 7 4 This trend can be attributed in
part to a growing belief in the need to eliminate the large public
mental hospital, and perhaps also to a backlash to the increasing in-
cidence of a statutory and court-mandated right to treatment. It has
been marked by the unceremonious discharge of patients without
any serious consideration of their need for alternative care. In de-
scribing this development in California, one study noted:
[S]ome of these patients have gone to run-down transient hotels
where they pay twelve to fifteen dollars a week for a single room;
some have gone to "board and care" homes, located typically in
poor, crime-ridden areas. The supervision of former patients in
these homes is often minimal, since the only license needed to operate
a six-bed board-and-care home in any county in California is a ten-
dollar business license. Other patients have gone to premature
deaths.1 7 5
It is apparent that the direct result of such discharges will often be
an erosion of many of the therapeutic benefits achievable through
in-institution treatment . 7  Consequently, without inclusion of post-
173. See Aviram & Segal, supra note 83; Ozarin, supra note 75.
174. See, e.g., BELKNAP, supra note 45; Klerman, supra note 68, at 786. See also The
New York Times, January 7, 1975, at 37, col. 4.
175. CHU & TROTrER, supra note 48, at 42-43 (footnote omitted).
176. It appears that significant numbers of at least nondangerous involuntary public
mental patients may be discharged, perhaps precipitously, in wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Many state mental
health officials are likely to view O'Connor as presenting them with a choice between
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discharge treatment plans involving, where necessary, 171  placement
in suitable aftercare facilities, the right to treatment cannot promise
to be effective. Similarly, where institutional confinement has been
antitherapeutic, causing regression of a preexisting psychiatric con-
dition or inflicting new types of psychological distress, community-
based aftercare may be essential if the former patient is to avoid the
"revolving door" effect of rehospitalization . 78
VI. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
The right to treatment, as promulgated in Wyatt v. Stickney179
and subsequent cases," has recently emerged in a hybrid form. This
form, referred to as the "right to be free from harm,' 81 is not premised
in the quid pro quo, due process rationale, but appears instead to be
based on the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.8 2
In New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rocke-
feller,'1s the court rejected the application of Judge Johnson's due
process analysis in Wyatt1s4 to a suit involving allegedly unconstitu-
providing meaningful treatment to nondangerous involuntary patients or releasing
them outright. Furthermore, because mental health personnel face possible personal
liability as a result of the O'Connor decision, they may err on the side of outright
release. To date, at least one state mental hospital has released over 100 involuntary
patients in the wake of O'Connor because of lack of resources to provide treat-
ment, even though no adequate community alternatives were available. See note 146
and accompanying text supra.
177. Predischarge planning, involving placement in after-care facilities, may not
be necessary for mental patients with personal resources or community ties sufficient to
ensure adequate postdischarge support and treatment. It should be noted, however, that
a placement with friends or family can, in some cases, be foreseeably antitherapeutic.
Consequently, even where a patient's family indicates a desire or willingness to offer
assistance and support, placement in publicly-supported aftercare facilities may be
necessary to maximize potential for successful postdischarge adjustment. Cf. FREEMAN &
SIMMONS, supra note 169; Landy & Griffith, supra note 96.
178. In this respect, a due process argument for aftercare as part of the quid pro
quo discussed in the Wyatt and Donaldson cases is conceptually analogous to the
eighth amendment approach developed below. See note 200 and accompanying text infra.
179. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by
defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341, enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (1972), afJ'd sub norn.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
180. See note 110 supra.
181. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
182. The eighth amendment has, of course, been incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
183. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
184. In so doing, the court distinguished Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1967), from the facts of the case before it, which involved retarded children committed to
New York's Willowbrook State School. The court noted that the summary nature of
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tional treatment of retarded children committed to New York's Willow-
brook State School. In recognizing the increased willingness of the
federal courts to inquire into the conditions of confinement,185 the
court noted that institutionalization for any reason involves restric-
tions, but that persons residing in state institutions cannot be punished
inconsistently with eighth amendment principles.186
Aside from the issue of whether involuntary civil commitment with-
out treatment may constitute, by itself, an eighth amendment viola-
tion,'187 it is clear that conditions existing in a public mental institu-
tion can be so oppressive and debilitating as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment."' In this regard, the arguments proffered in
the Rouse commitment was not present because there had been no refusal to release any
Willowbrook resident, and that the extended period of confinement involved in Rouse
and its progeny was not an issue. 357 F. Supp. at 761. The court did note, however,
that due process may be an element in the right to protection from harm. Id. at 762.
See generally Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 155-61 (1971).
185. The focal point in this part of the court's analysis stemmed from cases
challenging the conditions in state penal institutions. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), application for rehearing
en banc granted, 500 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278
(M.D. Ala. 1972), remanded, 503 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1974), af'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971), enforced, 358 F. Supp.
338 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). Cf. Haines
v. Kerner, 427 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
186. The court in Rockefeller did not rest its decision exclusively on the eighth
amendment. It noted that:
The rights of Willowbrook residents may rest on the Eighth Amendment, the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment .... It is not necessary now to determine which
source of rights is controlling.
357 F. Supp. at 764. However, most of the authorities relied upon dealt with eighth
amendment standards for confinement; and the standards against which the court
found that harm to the inmate must be tested, such as "civilized standards of humane
decency," id. at 765, are derived from eighth amendment cases. Cf. Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
For cases extending eighth amendment protection to confinement in other than
penal institutions, see Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972) (persons confined
for observation or by civil commitment); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.
N.Y. 1972) (children in need of supervision); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social
Services, 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modifying 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(children in need of supervision); United States ex rel. Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F.
Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cited with approval in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 735
(1972) (persons confined in hospital for criminally insane). Cf. Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
187. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962). See generally Ferleger,
supra note 69, at 490; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment,
77 YALE L.J. 87, 97-100 (1967).
188. See Burt, Eighth Amendment Rights in Mental Institutions, 2 LEGAL RIGHs
OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 735, 737 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973). But see
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Wyatt v. Stickney 89 would appear to be applicable to most of America's
public mental institutions. There, it was contended that:
"The conditions in the Alabama mental institutions-the physical
deprivation, the lack of basic sanitation, the overcrowding, the lack
of physical exercise, the inadequate diet, the unchecked violence
of inmates against each other and of employees against inmates, the
lack of adequate medical care and psychiatric care, the abuse of
solitary confinement and restraint-constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Indeed, the conditions bear a close resemblance to
conditions which have been held to be unconstitutional in cases
involving convicted criminals and persons accused of crime. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Wright v, McMann, 387 F.2d 519
(2nd Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn.
1969); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).' 190
The courts have shown a consistent readiness to apply eighth amend-
ment standards to penal institutions. 19 Their application to conditions
of confinement for the civilly-committed mental patient who has not
committed any criminal act must be equally, if not more, compelling. 92
A more complex question is presented in the issue of how far
the courts may be willing to go in terms of providing a remedy for
the damage suffered by the public mental patient as a result of con-
finement to an institution where the psychological and physical
environment is found to be violative of eighth amendment protec-
tions. 193 If the eighth amendment confers a right upon the mental
Developments, supra note 115, at 1330-33, discussing both the "impact" and "intent"
theories of punishment, and concluding that the "invocation of the eighth amendment
is an unnecessary analytical step" in finding a right treatment. Id. at 1333.
189. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
190. Burt, supra note 188, at 739, quoting amici's brief. See also discussion of general
conditions existing in many modern-day public mental institutions, section VI supra.
191. See cases cited at note 185 supra.
192. Cf. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Aflieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (D.R.I.
1972).
193. It should be noted that the ultimate applicability of the eighth amendment
to the public mental institution-a matter not yet confronted by the Supreme Court-
may well depend on the "cumulative effect" of the institutional milieu upon the in-
dividual, and the way this effect is perceived by the Court. In the most recent pro-
nouncement of eighth amendment principles in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
five justices concurred in invalidating the death penalty as applied in Georgia. Al-
though there was no opinion for the Court, the common thread in the opinions con-
curring in the judgment appeared to place varying importance on several factors.
These included: the severity of the punishment; the probability of its being inflicted
arbitrarily; the acceptability of the punishment by contemporary society; and the issue
of whether the punishment serves the state's [penal] purposes more effectively than
some less severe approach. Where these factors coalesce, to a degree and extent not
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patient to be free from harm or to be protected from deterioration,
as was indicated by the court in Rockefeller, the problem arises as
to whether elimination of the abuses complained of and the initiation
of institutional treatment programs will be sufficient to redress the
substantial destruction to the individual that may have been inflicted
by prolonged commitment. This issue would have special significance
for the individual committed because he presented a danger to him-
self, where the only real justification for commitment would have
been the state's interest in protecting him from harming himself. At
least as to him, the state would seem to have a responsibility to do
everything possible to protect against regression or deterioration
during the course of confinement.
In this context, the effect on retarded persons of confinement at
New York's Willowbrook State School, as revealed by evidence pre-
sented in the Rockefeller case, is instructive. One expert testified that:
"Confinement of mentally retarded persons in depriving institu-
tions tends to have severe, adverse consequences for the resident's
mental, emotional and physical functioning. Among these ad-
verse consequences are a decrease in the resident's measurable
intelligence, impairment of his adaptive behavior, decrease in his
self sufficientcy [sic], increase in his maladaptive and sterotyped
[sic] behavior, including rocking, aggression and self abuse, and in-
crease in his emotional distress: in short, a deterioration in the
resident's behavior and functioning, including his habits and
manners.
In a depriving institution, such as Willowbrook, the resident's
measure of intelligence can be expected to show continued de-
creases through the course of institutionalization. ' ' 194
The evidence further revealed that:
Confinement of the retarded to an impersonal and inadequate
institution such as Willowbrook is likely to have substantial adverse
clearly defined, a majority of the Court might find continued infliction of the punish-
ment violative of the eighth amendment. 408 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Assuming that the deplorable conditions, and lack of treatment, existing in many
public mental institutions constitute punishment in the constitutional sense, cf. Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), there seems little doubt that the factors discussed
in Furman are, to varying degrees, sufficiently present to achieve a "cumulative effect"
necessary to find eighth amendment violations.
194. 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 750 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman
eds. 1973), citing, Post Trial Affidavit of Professor Earl Butterfield of January 19, 1973,
in New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
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consequences on their [patients'] ability to cope with the societal
environment and to maximize their human inequalities.195
In many cases, the effects of this kind of personal deterioration
are likely to be long-term. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that
these by-products of confinement in institutions such as Willowbrook
are likely to persist after the individual is released from confinement.,,,
In such cases, the release of the patient pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus, or even the initiation of a court or statutorily-mandated treat-
ment program, would quite possibly be insufficient to effect an amelio-
ration of the damage caused by past institutional experience. 197
It is in this regard that a meaningful application of the eighth
amendment's guarantees should be held to require more than a remedy
limited to the release of the patient from confinement or the imposi-
tion of a judicially structured program of in-hospital treatment, which
might act prospectively only. Where the patient seeks legal redress
for the violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, 98 and where he can establish that physical or psychological
damage or deterioration has been sustained as a result of the state's
failure to protect him against harm, the proper remedy should in-
clude the state's provision of a therapeutic program subsequent to
discharge from the institution.199
195. Id. at 751.
196. The district court noted that the parents, family or guardians of the Willow-
brook patients were not denied the power to effect a patient's release, New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), and
that some 27% of the institution's patients were voluntary. Id. at 756. Consequently,
it is possible that a parent or guardian could remove the patient from the institution
prior to identification and amelioration of institutionally-created disabilities.
197. Even in state institutions where the decision to discharge rests in the sole
discretion of the administrative staff, the application of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine might well require the release of the patient before a newly-initiated treat-
ment program could ameliorate the damage done during confinement. See section VII infra
for a discussion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine and involuntary commit-
ment.
198. Although earlier cases challenging conditions in public mental institutions
were frequently brought in the form of habeas corpus, see, e.g., cases cited in Donaldson
v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 523 nn.26, 27 (5th Cir. 1974), most recent cases have sought
declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
199. In a consent decree issued in continued litigation involving New York's Willow-
brook Hospital subsequent to the opinion of the district court in the Rockefeller case,
the defendants agreed, inter alia, to establish within a 12-month period 200 new com-
munity placements in hostels, halfway homes, group homes, sheltered workshops, and
day care training programs to meet the needs of residents who will be transferred
there; to request the state legislature to provide at least $2,000,000 for financing, leasing,
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In the case of a patient who is able to privately arrange an ac-
ceptable and adequate community placement, the state's obligation
should include state-subsidized medical and psychiatric treatment.
Where the patient is unable to arrange an adequate placement be-
cause of indigency or lack of community ties, the state should be re-
quired to provide aftercare treatment and facilities. 20 0 Such services
and facilities, including foster homes, halfway houses, day-or-night
care programs, sheltered workshops, and community mental health
centers, would provide the discharged patient lodging, medical care,
employment training, and other supportive services until he or she
has overcome institutionally-created disabilities, or until the best
available professional judgment indicates that such services can no
longer be useful in helping the patient reintegrate into the
community.201
An alternative remedy potentially available to the mental pa-
tient for harm sustained as a result of institutional confinement would
be a civil damage action.20 2 The viability of this approach has been
recognized in Donaldson, which was the first major right-to-treatment
and operating the 200 new community placements; to request the legislature to provide
additional funds to develop and operate community facilities and programs for the
ensuing 5 years; and to develop an individual plan of care, education, and training for
each of Willowbrook's 3,000 residents to prepare them for life in the community. New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, No. 72-C-356 (E.D.N.Y., May 5, 1975);
9 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEw 209 (1975).
200. A similar argument would be applicable where the patient has suffered physical
or mental deterioration not attributable to the ordinary progression of his mental illness,
tinder the more widely adopted due process, quid pro quo right to treatment rationale
adopted by the court of appeals in Donaldson and by the district court in Wyatt. In
that context, the provision of aftercare services would be an integral part of the "quid"
due the patient in exchange for the "quo" of the patient's having surrendered his free-
dom to the state as a result of his commitment. See note 121 and accompanying text
supra.
201. In preliminary orders in Wyatt the district court found that many inmates
in the institutions involved did not suffer from mental illness. The court ordered
these patients released, and further ordered the state to provide "appropriate"
transitional service and assistance to help repair the damage done to them by in-
carceration.
Theoretically, where the damage sustained by the patient as a result of the de-
structive aspects of institutional life is so massive as to be unremediable, the state's
obligation of support and care, either in the institutional or community setting, would
continue as long as the patient lives. In this situation, a common law tort action might
be invoked as an additional remedial device. For a discussion of potential tort liability
for failure to provide treatment, see Treatment Standards, supra note 159, at 530.
202. The eleventh amendment, of course, would preclude a damage award against
a state, see, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), but not against the
superintendent of a mental institution or other person acting under color of state
law. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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case pursued as an action to recover damages against hospital physicians
for deprivation of a mental patient's right to receive treatment.2 3
Where the deprivations of the patient's eighth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights have resulted in physical or mental deterioration, the pa-
tient's prayer for relief in a civil rights action brought pursuant to
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, could request damages
for the deprivation itself plus the amount necessary to provide care
and treatment in the community once the state's obligation to dis-
charge him becomes operative.
VII. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: A POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR
THE AFTERCARE OBLIGATION
A. Development of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine
in Constitutional Law
In recent years, a new conceptual tool has emerged in both prison
and mental health litigation which cuts across the framework of the
eighth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in identifying the states' obligations to their prisoners
and institutionalized mental patients. This concept, sometimes re-
ferred to as the "least restrictive alternative, ' ' 20 4 embodies very general
principles concerning the relationship between the state and the in-
203. The plaintiff in Donaldson successfully contended in the district court and
the court of appeals that the attending physician, having failed to provide treatment,
was constitutionally obligated to release him. Consequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in agreeing with the lower court's conclusions and jury
instructions concerning the nature and scope of the right to treatment, affirmed a jury
verdict of $28,500 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case to enable that court to consider the damages issue in light of Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), which is the Court's most recent decision on the
scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under that decision, the relevant question in a damage action against state officials is
whether the official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility" would violate the patient's foreseeable constitu-
tional rights, or "if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights or other injury" to the patient. Id. at 322.
204. This concept has also been referred to as the "least drastic alternative," Singer,
Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine
of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 51 (1972), and as the doctrine of the "reasonable alternative," Wormuth & Mirkin,
The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964). It appears to have
been derived from antitrust law, where the availability of less restrictive means of
competition militates against acceptance of economic justifications for anticompetitive
practice. Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967).
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dividual.10 5 Broadly stated, the concept requires the state, when
pursuing a legitimate goal, to choose a means to achieve that goal by
measures which either totally avoid invasion of private interests in
liberty or property or which invade those interests as minimally as
possible. In short, government is required to pursue the least restric-
tive course available to accomplish its desired purpose.216
One of the earliest applications of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine arose in the commerce clause setting. In Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison,2 0 7 the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance of
Madison, Wisconsin, which forbade the sale of pasteurized milk in the
city unless it had been pasteurized and bottled at an approved pasteuri-
zation plant within 5 miles of the center of the city. The Court, in
holding that the ordinance unjustifiably discriminated against inter-
state commerce, said:
In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local in-
dustry against competition from without the State, Madison plainly
discriminates against interstate commerce. This it cannot do, even
in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health
and safety of its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,
adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.20 8
The Court, in finding that reasonable and adequate alternatives to
the statutory scheme were available, manifested an overriding concern
that the exercise of the state's police power be minimally intrusive
in terms of applicable constitutional guarantees. 0 9
The least restrictive alternative doctrine has more recently
emerged in the context of cases involving first amendment issues.
Where state statutes regulating expression, belief, or association have
been challenged on grounds of vagueness or overbreadth, the Supreme
Court has frequently found the regulations invalid where they swept
205. One writer has, in the due process context, described the concept as requiring
that:
If government should restrict human activity only to implement a socially useful
purpose, government should restrict human activity no more than necessary to
implement that purpose. The intrusion should be minimal. A greater restriction
is not socially useful when a lesser one will do the job.
Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1082 (1968).
206. Cf. Wormuth &: Mirkin, supra note 204. For a general discussion of the least
restrictive alternative doctrine in the context of involuntary commitment standards, see
Developments, supra note 115, at 1245-53.
207. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
208. Id. at 354 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
209. Id. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). See generally
Struve, supra note 204.
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too broadly; i.e., imposed greater restrictions on the exercise of first
amendment rights than were essential to vindicate the state's in-
terests. 210 Essentially, the state must carefully discriminate between
protected and unprotected expression, and may be obligated to opt
for a less restrictive method of regulation where the distinction be-
tween the two is delicate.2 1 1
In Shelton v. Tucker,21 2 the Supreme Court struck down an Ar-
kansas statute requiring, as a condition of employment in a state-
supported school, that every teacher annually file an affidavit listing
every organization to which he or she had belonged or regularly con-
tributed within the preceding 5 years. While recognizing the state's
legitimate interest in the general qualifications of its teachers, the
Court said:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, the purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 21 3
Although the Court failed to suggest what alternatives were avail-
able to the state to accomplish its desired objectives, 21 4 the state was
put on notice that, in deciding which form of regulation to adopt, if
210. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
211. For a general discussion of the application of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine in the first amendment area, see Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amend-
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
212. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
213. Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Justice Frankfurter, in dissent,
disagreed with the Court's view of the extent to which the statute constrained fourteenth
amendment rights. He agreed, however, that when the reasonableness or fairness of a
measure is at issue in the due process context, the availability vel non of alternative
methods of proceeding was germane, and that the relevant issue was "whether, in light of
the particular kind of restriction upon individual liberty which a regulation entails, it is
reasonable for a legislature to choose that form of regulation rather than others less
restrictive." Id. at 494.
214. Possible explanations for the Court's failure to specify permissible alternatives
to legislation found too restrictive are discussed in Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 471-72 (1969). One further explanation may be
the Court's general reluctance, even when protecting preferred freedoms or fundamental
rights, to transgress into a traditionally legislative domain. This reluctance may bode
ill for the more specific approach taken by several lower federal courts in identifying,
although not compelling, those less restrictive alternatives that might pass constitutional
muster in the involuntary civil commitment area. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), modified, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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any, it would be best advised to be more cautious of the impositions
placed on its teachers' associational interests."z 5
Similarly, the Court, in United States v. Robel, 218 struck down a
federal statute on grounds of overbreadth because it abridged appel-
lee's first amendment right of association. Although the Court stated
as axiomatic that " '[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone
in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms,' ",217 it pro-
vided no specific guidelines to the government concerning what
standards of precision must be applied. The Court was unpersuaded
by the government's argument that it had considered one possible al-
ternative in passing the challenged statute, but had rejected the al-
ternative as inadequate. Instead, the Court defined the government's
general obligation, when drafting a statute which imposes a sub-
stantial burden on protected first amendment activities, in terms of
using means which have a "less drastic" impact on first amendment
freedoms. 218
The parameters of the Supreme Court's willingness to utilize a
least restrictive alternative concept in fourteenth amendment juris-
prudence seem to be coterminous with the Court's inclination to apply
an unusually high level of scrutiny to the legislative action in ques-
tion. In the due process area, the Court has continuously expressed its
special sensitivity to legislative action which restricts the "political
processes" or which discriminates against "discrete and insular minori-
ties." 21 9 Clearly, the Court's use of less restrictive alternative language
215. For examples of state court decisions applying the least restrictive alternative
doctrine in accommodating state legislative interests with state or federal constitutional
provisions, see City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1970), and other
cases cited in Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MicH. L. REV. 1107, 1149-50 (1972).
216. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
217. Id. at 265, citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
218. Other first amendment cases relevant in this context include Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). It should be noted that the
phrase "least restrictive alternative" may, in one sense, be misleading. Because the
courts have generally failed to specify which alternatives would be permissible, see note
214 supra, there has often been no clear guidance to the state legislatures in terms of
how they must weigh their options. In finding that a regulation is too broad or intru-
sive, the courts have not expressly required that the least restrictive alternative which
is theoretically possible must be adopted. In this respect it has been noted that "invoca-
tion of the phrase 'less drastic means' does not so much explain the result (of first
amendment cases) as announce it." Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment,
78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
219. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). In the
famous footnote 4 -of the opinion, Justice Stone presaged the Court's willingness to
apply a more exacting judicial scrutiny to legislation, allegedly directed toward minori-
ties, which infringed upon freedom of speech, association, or expression. For a thorough
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manifests the more sensitive view it takes of the burdens imposed upon
the individual where "preferred freedoms" are involved. 220 On the
other hand, in areas where the state can legitimately act, and where
preferred interests or suspect classifications are not involved, the
standard for testing the legitimacy of that action has invariably been
one of "rationality."221 Inherent in this approach is the broad dis-
cretion permitted the states in acting legislatively, and the presump-
tion of validity attached to such legislation even if its effect is to
burden a group or interest more restrictively than absolutely neces-
sary.
The close association between the least restrictive alternative con-
cept and the importance the Supreme Court ascribes to the individual
interest adversely affected by legislation is further demonstrated by re-
cent developments in fourteenth amendment equal protection
principles.2 During the past 15 years, and especially under the
guidance of the late Chief Justice Warren, the Court has developed
a new equal protection standard to be applied where state legislative
actions have been found to infringe upon certain "fundamental
values' '223 or have discriminated against "suspect classes. ' ' 22 4 Under this
test, mere rationality will not sustain the legislative classification under
discussion of this footnote from the Carolene Products case, see Wechsler, Stone and
the Constitution, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 764, 795-800 (1946).
220. As foreshadowed by the language of Justice Stone in the Carolene Products
case, first amendment rights have been consistently viewed by the Court as special. Cf.
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1972); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
See also Griswolid v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
For the most part, the Court has refused to apply the least restrictive alternative
doctrine to economic regulations. See generally Struve, supra note 204.
221. Cf. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 73 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
222. For general discussion of the evolution, application, and direction of the more
activist equal protection theory, see Note, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,
Municipal Services and Wealth, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lia. L. REV. 105 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Note, Equal Protection]. In many respects, the "compelling state interest"
equal protection standard may be viewed as inherently involving a search for the least
restrictive alternative.
223. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy held fundamental);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel held fundamental);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote held fundamental).
But see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (education not
fundamental); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (interest in decent, safe and
sanitary housing not fundamental).
224. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race held to be suspect classifica-
tion); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (classification according to
alienage found "suspect").
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equal protection challenge. Instead, the state must show that such laws
are "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." '225
Moreover, in satisfying this test, it is not sufficient for the state to
show that the classification chosen to accomplish its objective furthers
a very substantial state interest. In pursuing its important interest, the
state
cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict con-
stitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with "precision," . . . and must be "tailored"
to serve their legitimate objectives. . . . And if there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way
of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic
means."
28
In this context, perhaps the clearest approval and articulation of
the least restrictive alternative doctrine by the Supreme Court came
in a recent case in which the Court rejected an equal protection
challenge to Texas' system for financing public elementary and
secondary schools. 2 7 After holding that education was not a "funda-
mental interest," the Court discarded appellees' argument that local
control over Texas schools (one of the state's proffered justifications
for its financing system) could be preserved and promoted under
other financing systems that resulted in more equality in educational
expenditures. To this contention, the Court responded:
Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest,
other methods of satisfying the State's interest, which occasion "less
drastic " disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only where
state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least re-
strictive alternative."228
225. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (first emphasis added).
226. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
227. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
228. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
A more recent application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine has created
some ambiguity with reference to the Court's willingness to require the states to show
that other, less intrusive forms of regulation are not available. In Marston v. Lewis,
410 U.S. 679 (1973), the Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that Arizona's 50-day
durational voter residency requirement and its 50-day voter registration requirement
were constitutional. The Court accepted the state's claim that the residence require-
ments were necessary to achieve the state's legitimate goals, without examining the
prospect that those same goals could be achieved by an increase in expenditures to
improve the administration of the deputy registrar system, which would reduce the
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B. The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine and the Mental Patient
The increasing awareness of the substantial deprivations created
by commitment to the traditional public mental institution, coupled
with the recognition that even short-term hospitalization can be anti-
therapeutic,229 has created a framework for application of the least
restrictive alternative doctrine to the public mental patient. 230 Such
an application would encompass the recognition of an affirmative state
obligation to require a search for alternatives to institutional commit-
ment ab initio.2s ' A concomitant duty would exist to limit confinement
to the least restrictive institutional setting and to discharge the com-
mitted patient outright, or to less restrictive community treatment
alternatives, once continued institutionalization could no longer be
restriction on the fundamental individual interest in voting. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972). Justice Marshall, writing for Justices Douglas and Brennan in dissent
in Marston, reasoned that a total bar to participation in voting by new Arizona resi-
dents could only be justified by the state's showing that "administrative problems of
the highest order" would be created by a lower durational residency requirement. 410
U.S. at 685.
In this respect, the Marston decision indicates a growing reluctance by a majority
of the Court to apply the least restrictive alternative doctrine in a more literal sense,
and further indicates that once a threshold determination is made concerning the in-
validity of an outside limit of restrictiveness (i.e., the 1-year residency requirement
struck down in Dunn), the Court may refuse to impose additional burdens upon the
state. In the context of a state obligation to provide aftercare services to involuntarily
committed mental patients, the threshhold issue of maximum restrictiveness has not
yet been confronted by the Court. But the general statement of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine in Dunn remains viable, and its application to the massive de-
privations suffered by the mental patient should still be consistent with the argu-
ments developed below. Cf. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. REV. 844, 911-18 (1970).
229. See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 278.
230. Numerous federal courts have applied the least restrictive alternative doctrine
to state correctional institutions, especially in the context of eighth amendment and
equal protection arguments involving confinement of pretrial detainees. For example,
in Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971), the court said: "it is
manifestly obvious that the conditions of incarceration for detainees must, cumulatively,
add up to the least restrictive means of achieving the purpose requiring and justifying
the deprivation of liberty." Accord, Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.
Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972);
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.
Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), afJ'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
The courts, in viewing the states' purpose in confining the pretrial detainee as ex-
clusively to ensure his appearance at trial, have held that his constitutional rights can
only be restricted to the extent necessary to restrain him from endangering or dis-
rupting institutional security. See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
231. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in the context
of the states' duty to create new alternatives in lieu of civil commitment, see Developments,
supra note 115, at 1250-53.
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therapeutic. Developing case law in this area is recognizing that the
states must provide less restrictive treatment facilities and services as
a condition precedent to involuntarily confining an individual to the
public mental institution.
The first express application of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine to the mental institutional setting appears to have been in
Lake v. Cameron,2 3 2 where the court interpreted the relevant civil
commitment statute as requiring a finding by the committing court
that no less onerous disposition than institutional confinement would
serve the purpose of commitment, and thus ordered the committing
court to consider alternatives to hospitalization. Subsequently, in
Covington v. Harris,233 the same court stated that regardless of the
provisions of the applicable statute, "the principle of the least restric-
tive alternative consistent with the legitimate purposes of a commit-
ment inheres in the very nature of civil commitment, which entails
an extraordinary deprivation of liberty .... ."234 The court then held
that the principle was "equally applicable to alternate dispositions
within a mental hospital."2 35
The application of the least restrictive alternative, as promulgated
in Covington, was subsequently relied upon by the district court in
Wyatt v. Stickney .23 In Wyatt, the court held that involuntarily
committed mental patients had a constitutional right to such treatment
or habilitation as would help each of them to be cured or to improve
his or her mental condition.23 7 Although the court's original opinion
did not independently deal with the right of public mental patients
to confinement to or in the least restrictive setting, 238 the court's
ultimate remedial order incorporated the doctrine as an integral part
of the state's treatment obligation. In terms of the mentally ill civilly
confined in state institutions, the court established minimum consti-
tutional standards for adequate treatment. The standards include the
recognition that "patients have a right to the least restrictive condi-
tions necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment. ' ' 2 19 Moreover,
the State of Alabama was required to establish individualized treat-
232. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
233. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
234. Id. at 623.
235. Id.
236. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by
defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341, enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (1972), aff'd in part, re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
237. For discussion of the Wyatt case in the right to treatment context, see sec-
tion V supra.
238. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
239. 344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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ment plans for all patients, which were to include criteria for release
to less restrictive treatment conditions and for discharge;240 an in-
dividualized posthospitalization plan -;241 and a requirement that a
designated hospital staff member would be responsible for assuring
that each patient is released, where appropriate, into a less restrictive
form of treatment.4 2 In a separate order, similar requirements were
held applicable to mentally retarded persons confined in state insti-
tutions,24 3 with the additional requirement that no person should be
admitted to an institution without a prior determination having been
made that confinement in the institution per se was the least restric-
tive habilitative setting feasible.244
Although the Wyatt court cited Covington as authority for the
right to treatment, 4. the remedial order went far beyond the Coving-
ton court's application of the least restrictive alternative. In this
respect, Judge Johnson, although not stating his underlying rationale,
fashioned a remedy which not only required the state to provide
institutional treatment in the least restrictive setting, but also re-
quired the state to act affirmatively to fulfill its duty to "provide ade-
quate transitional treatment and care for all patients released after a
period of involuntary confinement, ' '246 which included "psychiatric
day care, treatment in the home by a visiting therapist, nursing home
or extended care, out-patient treatment, and treatment in the psy-
chiatric ward of a general hospital."2 47
The remedy promulgated by the court in Wyatt appears to have
gone beyond the conceptual framework for the right to treatment es-
tablished in the court's original opinion. In this context, a view of
the right to treatment as including treatment in the least restrictive
institutional setting is consistent with the due process rationale de-
veloped by Judge Johnson. However, an extension of the state's treat-
ment obligation into the community should generally create a larger
drain on the state's resources than an obligation that only extends to
institutional treatment. Since there is no way to determine from the
Wyatt record precisely what aftercare resources already existed in
Alabama, it is difficult to determine what impact the decision will
have on that state in terms of the development of alternative mental
240. Id. at 384.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
244. Id. at 396.
245. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
246. 344 F. Supp. at 386 (emphasis added).
247. Id. See also 344 F. Supp. at 407, 47 (applicable to mentally retarded patients).
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health placement services. Conceivably, however, the state would have
to develop transitional care modalities, even if this evolved into a
much costlier proposition than institutional treatment itself. In terms
of future commitments, Alabama would presumably have to choose
between ensuring the existence of sufficient aftercare services for each
patient requiring them for truly meaningful treatment, or discon-
tinuing its entire civil commitment program.248
Subsequent to Wyatt, several other cases in the mental health field
have endorsed the application of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine to involuntary commitment. In sustaining a constitutional
challenge to Wisconsin's civil commitment procedures, a three-judge
federal court held that persons suffering from the condition of mental
illness, who had not been accused of criminal conduct, could not be
institutionalized if there were less drastic means available for achieving
the basic goals of such commitment.1 9 The court did not, however,
address the issue of whether the state had an obligation to actually
provide alternatives to commitment where none were otherwise avail-
able. The issue was raised in Welsch v. Likins,2 50 where Minnesota's
248. It should be noted that the district court in Wyatt specifically prohibited the
admission of any person to any publicly supported residential institution caring for
mentally retarded persons unless such institution meets the standards set out in the
court's order. 344 F. Supp. at 407.
Also noteworthy is the State of Alabama's argument in the court of appeals that the
district court's order was improper because it would require heavy expenditures and
reallocations of state resources. This contention was rejected by the court of appeals.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963).
249. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974), modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
It should be noted that in Sanchez v. New Mexico, 396 U.S. 276 (1970), dismissing
for want of substantial federal question 457 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1969), the Supreme Court
did not recognize a substantial constitutional issue in the contention that a state must
explore less restrictive alternatives as a condition precedent to involuntary civil commit-
ment. However, as noted by the district court in Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487,
501 (D. Minn. 1974), the Sanchez case came to the Court prior to the rapid doctrinal
developments in the judicial definition of the rights of mental patients that has taken
place in the last several years. Moreover, the Court has frequently dismissed cases for
failure to present substantial federal questions only to accept and decide the same
issue in subsequent appeals. Compare McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961),
with Commonwealth v. Grochowiak, 136 A.2d 145, 148 (Pa. 1957), appeal dismissed for
want of substantial federal question, 358 U.S. 47 (1958).
For a more recent discussion of the proper weight of a dismissal for want of substantial
federal question, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), where the Court
cited with approval Port Authority Bondholders Protective Comm'n v. Port of New
York Authority, 387 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967) (" 'unless and until the Supreme
Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that
if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal
developments indicate otherwise.' ").
250. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
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failure to provide institutional treatment and alternatives to institu-
tionalization was challenged on due process grounds. After holding
that due process required that civil commitment for reasons
of mental retardation be accompanied by adequate treatment, the
court noted the "widespread acceptance by the courts of a constitutional
duty on the part of State officials to explore and provide the least
stringent practicable alternatives to confinement of noncriminals." 251
The court failed, however, to address itself to the scope of the state's
obligation.
A more recent application of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine to the civil commitment area has occurred in Davis v. Wat-
kins,252 where plaintiffs are seeking to establish a right to treatment
at Ohio's Lima State Hospital, a maximum security public mental
institution. In an interim order, the court has endorsed and adopted
the reasoning and remedy promulgated by Judge Johnson in the Wyatt
case. 253 Individualized treatment plans required by the court provide
for the least restrictive setting while in confinement, and require ex-
tensive prerelease planning for each patient. Additionally, the court
has required the State of Ohio to implement a mandatory periodic
review of each treatment plan for the purpose of evaluating a patient's
continued need, and the State's continued justification, for placement
in a maximum security facility. Moreover, the court has ordered the
Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to pro-
vide adequate transitional treatment and care for all patients released
from the hospital. 2
54
251. Id. at 502. The court viewed due process as requiring that the appropriate
officials make good faith efforts to place civilly-committed persons in "settings that will
be suitable and appropriate to their mental and physical conditions while least restric-
tive of their liberties." Id.
252. 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (interim order).
253. Id. at 1197.
254. In a telephone conversation of March 14, 1975, with C. Thomas McCarter, Esq.,
co-counsel for plaintiffs, the writer was advised that the issue of providing aftercare
services and facilities to patients discharged from Lima Hospital to the community has
not been vigorously pursued, and a clear definition of the scope of the state's obliga-
tion in this regard has not yet been given by the court. The percentage of plaintiffs
who have been involuntarily committed directly to Lima, pursuant to OHio REV. CODE
§ 5122.15 (Page Supp. 1975), is relatively small. Most of the institution's patients have
been transferred to Lima from other state institutions or have been confined at Lima
after either having been found incompetent to stand trial for criminal charges or having
been acquitted for reasons of insanity pursuant to OHso REV. CODE § 2945.39 (Page
1970). Mr. McCarter indicated that most Lima Hospital patients leave the institu-
tion pursuant to administrative transfers to the correctional or lesser-security mental
institutions from which they were received. Many others are remitted back to the
custody of the committing court when found able to stand trial. Counsel for plaintiffs,
however, have interpreted the court's interim order as requiring the State of Ohio to
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The remedial requirements in the Wyatt and Davis cases establish
the involuntarily-committed mental patient's right to confinement in,
and release to, the least restrictive alternative setting as an element of
a due process right to treatment. Neither the original opinion in
Wyatt nor the interim order in Davis expressly deals with the least
restrictive alternative doctrine as an independent element of the due
process guaranty."' However, the conclusions and remedies reached
by both courts can be viewed as consistent with the least restrictive
alternative doctrine as developed in the first amendment and equal
protection cases discussed above.
In this regard, most states have defined their objectives in the
establishment of involuntary civil commitment procedures in terms
of treatment for those mentally-ill persons incapable of caring for
themselves, or providing treatment for those who, because of mental
illness, represent a danger to themselves or others. Once this state
provide suitable aftercare facilities and services for all Lima patients who are ultimately
discharged from the state's custody and jurisdiction.
255. See also Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975). In that case,
plaintiffs sought to compel creation of least restrictive alternative facilities for more
than 1,000 patients involuntarily confined in St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washing-
ton, D.C. The patient-plaintiffs proceeded upon two separate theories. First, they
claimed that the District of Columbia's 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act,
21 D.C. CODE § 501 (1973), L. No. 88-597 (1964), imposes a duty on the defendants-
who include the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and various District of
Columbia officers responsible for the care of the mentally ill in the District-to place
the patient-plaintiffs in suitable least restrictive alternative facilities. Second, the
patient-plaintiffs contended that they have a federal constitutional right to be placed in
suitable alternative facilities and thereby to be provided with suitable care and treat-
ment under the least restrictive setting. The constitutional claims were premised upon a
right to care and treatment guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
and upon a separate constitutional principle of the least restrictive alternative.
The court found it unnecessary to reach the patient-plaintiffs' constitutional argu-
ment, finding the statutory grounds sufficient for resolution of the matter. However, in
construing the Act, the court acknowledged the doctrine of the least restrictive alterna-
tive and held the Act mandated the doctrine's application at the treatment stage as
well as the commitment stage. The court ordered
that the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act requires that patients con-
fined in St. Elizabeths Hospital pursuant to the 1964 Act receive suitable care and
treatment under the least restrictive conditions as such conditions are required
in an individual case consistent with the purposes of the Act; . . . that both de-
fendants have violated the 1964 Act by failing to place plaintiffs and members of
their class, who are inpatients at St. Elizabeths Hospital and who have been
determined suitable for placement in alternative facilities in proper facilities
that are less restrictive alternatives to the Hospital, as it is presently constituted,
such alternatives including but not being limited to nursing homes, foster
homes, personal care homes and half-way houses . . ..
405 F. Supp. at 979.
1976]
286 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:232
purpose has been defined, it follows that the term of hospitalization
must be measured by its actual and potential results. 26 Where it is
determined that a given patient is not treatable, or where further
efforts directed to in-confinement treatment are predictably anti-
therapeutic, 257 further confinement must be deemed to effect a con-
tinuing violation of due process. This conclusion is compelled by the
substantial deprivations of liberty imposed by institutional confine-
ment, both in terms of freedom of movement and the restraints im-
posed on the patients' rights to privacy, free association and speech,
and travel.2 .8 Where the manifest burdens imposed on the exercise of
rights as important as these 5 9 are completely unnecessary or unrelated
to the achievement of the state's interest in treatment, the state be-
comes obliged, as a matter of due process, to choose a less restrictive
form of regulation.2 6 0
The application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in this
256. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), where the Court stated: "At
the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."
257. A review of available mental health research indicates a near-consensus that
commitment to public mental institutions, at least for the longer periods of time, in-
variably becomes anti-therapeutic. See, e.g., Honigfeld & Gillis, The Role of Institution-
alization in the Natural History of Schizophrenia, 28 DIsEAsEs OF THE NE vous SYSTEM
660-63 (1967); Mendel, On the Abolition of the Psychiatric Hospital, COMI'REHENSIVE
MENTAL HEALTH 237-47 (1968).
258. For a general discussion of the adverse effect of confinement on the mental
patient, outside of the obvious restraints on the freedom to come and go, see Chambers,
supra, note 215 at 1155-68. See also Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health,
Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), and note
228 and accompanying text supra.
259. The Supreme Court has recognized that many of these individual interests,
which are curtailed by institutional confinement in varying degrees, are fundamental.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(travel); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association).
260. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also section VIiA and accompany-
ing notes supra. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 263 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
The applicability of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in the involuntary civil
commitment area may have been, at least in part, implicity approved by the United States
Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Although the Court
expressly stated that it would not decide "whether, when, or by what procedures, a
mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under
contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement," id.
at 573, the Court cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960), for the
following proposition:
W]hile the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarcera-
tion is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of
those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends.
422 U.S. at 575.
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context would make ongoing hospitalization of the involuntary mental
patient-at least as generally known and practiced in America today"' 1-
dependent upon the state's demonstration that institutional confine-
ment will improve the patient's mental condition and that it will en-
hance the patient's ability to adjust satisfactorily in the community. 22
Although a state cannot be expected to review each patient on a daily
basis to determine when further institutional care reaches the point
of diminishing therapeutic return, it must be obliged to adopt reason-
able procedures toward that end.2 6 3 When a determination is made
that further confinement would no longer be conducive to further
treatment, the least restrictive alternative doctrine would require that
the hospital either discharge the patient unconditionally, or release
him to some less restrictive setting for future care. It is in this respect
that the Wyatt court's requirement that the state act affirmatively to
provide adequate transitional treatment and care for all patients can be
deemed compatible with the court's due process analysis.
VIII. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE DISCHARGE PROCESS
One further argument in support of the obligation of the states
to provide aftercare services deserves brief attention. This argument,
apparently not yet tested in the courts nor generally dealt with by legal
commentators, centers around the traditional criteria applied to the
administrative discharge process in public mental institutions.
The prevailing procedures for both conditional release and abso-
lute discharge from public mental institutions generally vest substan-
tial discretion in hospital authorities. 26 4 Primarily, this can be at-
tributed to traditional legislative reliance on the professional judgment
of hospital staff concerning the determination of a patient's ongoing
mental status and, especially in the case of the involuntary,
261. For a discussion of the potential of the mental hospital to be genuinely thera-
peutic and minimally intrusive on patients' civil and constitutional rights, see Yolles,
Mental Health's Homeostatic State: A New Territory, 7 INTL J. PSYCHIATRY 327-28
(1969).
262. See generally Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Com-
mitted Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1282, 1290-91 (1973).
263. For cases requiring periodic review of a mental patient's institutional pro-
gress, see Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (interim order) (re-
quiring review of each patient's treatment plan and the justification for continued con-
finement at least once a week for the first month after admission, once a month for the
next 2 months, and at least once every 90 days thereafter); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 387, 397 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 384, 386 (M.D.
Ala. 1972).
264. For general discussion of the processes of separation from mental hospitals, see
BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 133-54.
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indeterminately-committed patient, his ability to function in the com-
munity.265 Discharge from the institution does not necessarily mean that
the patient has been cured of the mental problem that precipitated his
commitment.2 66 In fact, some statutes expressly permit discharge of
unimproved patients where consistent with the welfare of the patient
and the community. 26 7
The extensive discretion placed in hospital administrators in terms
of the discharge decision has resulted in practices that appear constitu-
tionally suspect. As previously noted, most public mental institution
patients come from the lower socio-economic segments of the popula-
tion.26s Moreover, the process of involuntary, and in many cases inde-
terminate, confinement inevitably results in loss of job and home, and
other economic hardship. When the decision to discharge or to con-
ditionally release a patient is made, its ultimate outcome may depend
on an acceptable placement of the released patient in the community.
Too frequently, even where the professional judgment of the institu-
tional psychiatrist indicates a patient's medical readiness for separation
from the institution, the patient is retained because he has insufficient
personal resources to maintain himself in the community, or there is
no available publicly or charitably supported community alternative.2 69
Consequently, many patients remain in confinement solely because
they are too poor to be released. 270
265. Cf. Szasz, Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patients, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 220
(1960).
266. For an incisive analysis of the factors considered in the administrative discharge
decision, see ROCK, JACOBSON, & JANOPAUL, supra note 18, at 214-41.
267. Compare former Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 7-7 (Smith-Hurd
1966) with the present provision, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 10-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1975), which provides that a hospital may temporarily release a patient whose condition is
not considered appropriate for absolute discharge, and that if such a temporarily-
released patient is not returned to the hospital within 1 year, he shall be considered
absolutely discharged. See generally BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 2, at 137.
268. See Schneiderman, Social Class, Diagnosis and Treatment, 35 AM. J. ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 99 (1965). See also authorities cited at note 46 and accompanying text supra.
269. See Handy, Judgments of Release Readiness as Related to Discharge from a
Neurophychiatric Hospital, 10 COMMUNITY MENT. HEALTH J. 198 (1974); Hogarty, supra
note 74, at 202; Hogarty, Discharge Readiness: The Components of Casework Judgment,
47 Soc. CASEWORK 165 (1966). Cf. Weinstein, Real & Ideal Discharge Criteria, 15 MENT.
Hosp. 680 (1964).
270. See generally Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally II1, 16
CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 93 (1967).
This retention phenomenon is particularly applicable to aged mental patients, who
have frequently been admitted to a mental institution because friends and relatives who
would otherwise be expected to support and care for them refuse to do so, or are
financially unable to help. These elderly patients, frequently diagnosed as senile, become
the chronic "back-ward" patients who can only look forward to death in confinement.
See generally Pollack, Locke & Kramer, Trends in Hospitalization and Patterns of Care
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Whether the discriminatory retention of involuntarily-committed
mental patients derives from the operation of the discretion of a state
agency or from statutory provision,2 7 1 it results in the creation of two
classifications of mentally ill persons. Both classes consist of involuntary
mental patients who have achieved a level of mental recuperation or
stabilization that would compel the medical conclusion that they can
function acceptably outside of the institution. The one class, how-
ever, consists of those who, because of their personal or familial
financial resources, are in a position to develop their own placement
plans, and are therefore discharged. The second class is composed of
those who, because of their personal or familial lack of financial re-
sources, are not in a position to develop their own placement plans
and are therefore not discharged.
2 2
These classifications, based solely on wealth, would appear constitu-
tionally vulnerable. In recent years, the Supreme Court has frequently
struck down state classifications based upon wealth, especially where
those classifications encroached upon fundamental or preferred consti-
tutional rights.2 7 3 In Griffin v. Illinois,27 4 the Court held that a state
could not, in effect, deny an indigent criminal defendant access to an
of the Aged Mentally Ill, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF AGING 21 (Hoch & Zubin eds. 1961).
Cf. Pollack, Redick, Norman, Wurster & Gorwitz, Socioeconomic and Family Characteris-
tics of Patients Admitted to Psychiatric Services, 54 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 506 (1964).
271. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 426.130 (1974), which allows the committing court
to order the conditional release of a mentally ill person where a legal guardian, relative,
or friend requests permission to care for him during the period of commitment, provid-
ing such person can show that there are adequate financial resources available for suit-
able care.
272. The practical implications of this approach are, to say the least, quite com-
plex. Since no two mental patients are identical, and since patients whose initial
psychiatric diagnoses are the same will probably not respond identically to even the
most sophisticated treatment, substantial difficulties will be presented in terms of es-
tablishing an equivalent level of progress promising an equivalent prognosis for extra-
institutional adjustment. In this regard, more definite and reviewable standards would
have to be created to control the release decision. Cf. ROCK, JACOBSON & JANOPAUL,
supra note 18, at 215 (where the authors note that no single criterion of dischargeability
applies to all cases).
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that an institutional superintendent or psychiatrist
will admit that he has decided to release one patient but retain another solely because
of the latter's indigency. The more likely response, especially if solicited at a judicial
hearing, would be to distinguish the patients' levels of response to treatment or re-
mission, and to distinguish relative potential for community adjustment. Increased
utilization of periodic review procedures coupled with a presumption of adaptability
outside of the institution, might ameliorate this difficulty.
273. See generally Note, Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 130-46.
274. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). For other cases disapproving wealth classifications in the
criminal process area, see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235 (1970); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963). See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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appeal of his conviction solely because of his inability to pay for a
transcript of the trial proceedings. Similarly, the Court has indicated
its special sensitivity to, and has strictly scrutinized, classifications based
on wealth which infringe upon the right to vote.27 5 Moreover, the
Court, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 7 6
reaffirmed the view that classification based upon wealth may be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. Although the Court rejected appellee's con-
tentions that Texas' school financing system was sufficiently wealth-
related as to invoke strict judicial scrutiny, it did indicate its readiness
to examine closely such alleged discriminatory classifications in the
future where two distinguishing characteristics are found to be present.
First, it must be shown that the classification acts to the peculiar dis-
advantage of a class fairly definable as indigent.27 7 Second, it must be
demonstrated that the lack of personal finances has occasioned an ab-
solute deprivation of the desired benefit.2 7
8
It is submitted that both of the characteristics described by the
Court in Rodriguez as essential to holding a wealth-related classifica-
tion suspect are present in the discharge classifications under discus-
sion. The classification clearly acts to the peculiar disadvantage of a
well-defined group of indigent mental patients-those who cannot afford
to pay for their own placement and care in the community. Second,
the lack of adequate resources to live outside the institution-which
may very well have been caused by the commitment itself-results in
an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit, personal liberty. Even
if the patient were retained in a less restrictive institutional setting
than before, 279 he still would be subject to the massive restraints and
deprivations inherent in institutionalization. 280 Moreover, the Court's
275. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
276. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
277. Id. at 22.
278. Id. at 23. In Rodriguez, the Court found that although appellees' relative
poverty may have denied them absolute equality of education with students from
wealthier school districts, they still were provided by the state with a minimum or
adequate level of education. Thus, the deprivation occasioned by the Texas system
was not total and no equal protection violation resulted because "at least where
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality
or precisely equal advantages." Id. at 24 (footnote ommited).
279. As has been previously contended, the patient would have this right anyway
by virtue of the application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine. See section VII
supra.
280. See note 112 and accompanying text supra. Receiving "some" minimum amount
of education would clearly not be equivalent to receiving some greater degree of
privileges or freedom of movement within the four walls of -a mental hospital. Re-
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analysis (in constitutional terms) of the nature of the wealth dis-
crimination in Rodriguez must be viewed in the context of the personal
interest that has been vitiated or diminished. 211 In Rodriguez, educa-
tion was found not to be a fundamental or specially protected interest
in terms of its constitutional significance.28 2 But the individual's in-
terest in the personal liberty that has been taken away by involuntary
commitment to a mental institution must be considered fundamental-
perhaps the most fundamental interest an individual has under our
constitutional system. s8 Consequently, the classifications created by
the states in releasing those of its involuntarily-committed mental pa-
tients who can afford community placement, but retaining those who
cannot, is "suspect" as being wealth dependent while infringing upon
the fundamental personal interest in liberty.2 4
To justify such a classification, the state would have to show that
gardless of the privileges extended, the mental patient is still deprived of his freedom
to leave the hospital.
281. Defined elsewhere as the "new double helix of equal protection." see Note,
Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 148, the nature of the class discriminated against by
the legislation and of the personal interest adversely affected have tended to be
synergistically related: the more "suspect" the classification, the less "fundamental"
the interest required to trigger strict scrutiny.
282. 411 U.S. at 29-39.
283. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). See also State ex rel. Bles
v. Merrick, 205 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ohio 1965).
284. It should be noted that the Warren Court refused to find classifications
based upon wealth as per se unconstitutional. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Instead, the Court occasionally intimated that wealth classifications might be considered
suspect, especially when coupled with an infringement on constitutionally preferred
rights. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). See generally
G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1011-12, 1018-19 (8th ed. 1970).
Another approach to the inequities resulting from the process of discharge from
public mental institutions might view the mental illness status itself as being constitu-
tionally suspect for purposes of equal protection analysis. According to this view, the
characteristics which have been deemed essential to constitute a class as suspect are,
to varying degrees, associated with the mentally ill. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684-86 (1973) (plurality opinion) (the frequency with which a group has been
disadvantaged or stigmatized by legislative classifications); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (social opprobrium or stigmatization); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (the relative permanence of the
disadvantageous characteristic).
For a comprehensive analysis of the view that mental illness is a per se suspect
classification, see Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
According to this analysis, a condition precedent for mental illness's eligibility for
entry into the circle of classifications entitled to "suspect" status is numerical domina-
tion of legislatures (and presumably other official decision makers) by persons not
mentally ill. Id. at 1258. It would seem, at least theoretically, that most legislators
and most mental institution personnel responsible for the discharge decision are not
mentally ill.
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it was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.25 The only con-
ceivable interest the state would have in retaining custody over a mental
patient who has recuperated or stabilized sufficiently to indicate no
further medical need for confinement, but who cannot afford to live
on his own in the community, would be to ensure that the patient
receives food, clothing, shelter, and other necessaries sufficient for sur-
vival and to provide future medical-psychiatric care that may be
needed.28 6 But it is clear that continued confinement in a mental insti-
tution is not necessary to accomplish this interest.2 87 Placement in a
fosterhome, halfway house or other semi-structured environment,
accompanied by periodic visits from medical personnel, or trips to out-
patient facilities at community mental health centers or general
hospitals, would do just as well, and in most cases would be more
conducive to continued progress.2 8 8 And, more importantly, these
community alternatives would maximize the individual's interest in
personal liberty.
In the context of this argument, the states would be left with several
possible courses of action. One such course would be to completely
restructure public mental health systems so as to minimize their co-
285. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See also notes 219-28 and accompanying text supra.
Recent scholarly comment has pointed to the development of a new standard of
equal protection analysis which demands more than the rational connection between
the legislative classification and the legitimate state goal, but less than the precision
of legislative classification demanded by the strict judicial scrutiny approach. See
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1972).
This new test, described as a "sliding-scale" rationality test, id. at 17-18, has not been
sufficiently developed by the Supreme Court to predict its applicability to the wealth
classification area. See generally Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE
L.J. 1237, 1240-41 (1974).
286. One apparent exception to this reasoning might be the untreatable mental
patient who can be proven to be extremely dangerous. In this situation, the state's
interest in retaining some control over the individual, as a means of preventing violence
to himself or others, may be stronger. But substantial questions have been raised con-
cerning the predictability of dangerousness. See, e.g., Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On
the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968); Morris, Psychiatry
and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 532-36 (1968); Rubin, Prediction
of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCsWIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 397 (1972);
Szasz, Some Observations on the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Law, 75
ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 297 (1956).
287. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975), the Court indicated that
such continued confinement would be unconstitutional by stating:
Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm,
incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards
of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends.
288. See PASAMANICK, SCARPiITrI & DINITZ, supra note 168.
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ercive or restrictive characteristics. 289 A second alternative would be to
discontinue utilization of procedures such as the conditional or con-
valescent release, so that no one, regardless of wealth, could be released
until ready for absolute discharge. 290 A third approach might be to re-
structure the entire discharge system, so that persons with similar
preadmission diagnoses would be discharged after substantially similar
periods of confinement. But in view of the obvious propositions that
no two patients' illnesses are likely to be precisely the same in origin
and degree, nor likely to respond identically to even the most sophisti-
cated treatment, this latter approach could easily result in depriving
some patients of needed psychiatric attention.
A fourth response to the above discussed deficiency in discharge
procedures is perhaps the most reasonable. This approach would en-
tail the states' development and creation of adequate and sufficient
aftercare facilities and services in the relevant communities so that
an indigent mental patient whose continued institutionalization was
no longer medically justified could be released to a reasonable setting
at public expense. By pursuing this course, the states would at least
theoretically minimize the current effect of indigency upon a patient's
prospect for an early discharge and upon the opportunity for a success-
ful community adjustment. Although the establishment of meaning-
ful aftercare resources cannot realistically be expected to equalize
the opportunities available to wealthy and poor mental patients, it
could well serve to provide the minimum amount necessary to avoid
the kind of total deprivation which, by analogy to the reasoning in
Rodriguez, would be unconstitutional.
IX. CONCLUSION
Let the doctor beware, who does not now realize the amount of
289. It is extremely doubtful that our traditional large, isolated, and remote mental
institutions could be sufficiently modified to become truly unrestrictive. See, e.g., E.
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961). Perhaps the only conceivable system that would eliminate
the restrictiveness of a "total" institution would be one involving completely out-patient
oriented facilities, where patients could come and go at will. Of course, such a system
would necessitate the abolition of involuntary commitment, and would require truly
therapeutic, democratically administered facilities, probably based in the community.
290. The necessary corollary to this proposition would be the total abolition of the
public mental hospital, since the considerations of wealth that often permeate the de-
cision to provisionally discharge will inevitably enter into the decision to discharge
absolutely. Cf. MYERS & BEAN, supra note 46, at 80 (citing data showing direct
correlation between socio-economic class and prospect for discharge over a 10-year
period). See also Hardt & Feinhandler, Social Class and Mental Hospitalization Prog-
nosis, 24 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 815 (1959). Consequently, to the extent that a person's
ability to "pay for himself" in the community is related to the ultimate duration of
his confinement, the confinement itself becomes unconstitutional.
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mental illness he helped either to cause or to intensify by institu-
tionalizing mental patients. 291
This statement by Dr. Stanley Yolles, former Director of the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, adequately embodies the common
theme permeating the fourteenth and eighth amendment arguments
for aftercare discussed above. Despite the fact that governmental policy
is tending to show less reliance on the traditional mental institution as
the exclusive vehicle for the delivery of mental health care,29 2 the
institution continues to represent the core ingredient of existing state
programs. 293 And as long as these institutions continue to serve as breed-
ing grounds for neglect, abuse, and physical and psychological depriva-
tion, we must be cautious to ensure that we do not allow ourselves
to destroy lives under the pretense of saving them.
This article has addressed potential sources and rationales for the
creation of a right to aftercare treatment for the civilly-committed
public mental patient. The ideas developed above have been made in
full realization that the aftercare services and facilities now available
in the United States are woefully inadequate to provide the assistance
necessary to promote an orderly and constructive transition to com-
munity life for discharged patients, who would be condemned to re-
hospitalization or lives of suffering in their absence.294 The task of
providing the aftercare facilities required to serve even those patients
presently confined in public mental hospitals will not be accomplished
without substantial costs. 295 These costs, however, must be paid if we
are to fulfill the promise, whether express or implied, which we make
291. Yolles, supra note 261, at 328.
292. See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 345.
293. For the year ending June 30, 1973, there were 248,562 inpatients in state and
county mental hospital inpatient services. During that same year there were 444,777
inpatient additions to these facilities. Moreover, there were 334 state and county
institutions as of June 30, 1973, as opposed to the 327 public institutions existing on
June 30, 1972. Division of Biometry, National Institute of Mental Health, Statistical
Note 106 at 1, 2, 22 (1974).
294. See, e.g., R. GLASSCOTE, J. SussEx, E. CUMMING & L. SMITH, THE COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH CENTER: AN INTERIM APPRAISAL 31-32 (1969).
295. For an excellent discussion of the costs and other burdens which the states
would potentially have to face in providing meaningful aftercare services, see Chambers,
supra note 215, at 1193-1200. There is evidence, however, that once meaningful after-
care services are made available, the total costs associated with mental health care can
be significantly reduced. See, e.g., R. GLAsscoTE, J. GUDEMAN k R. ELPERS, HALFWAY
HOUSES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 24 (1971); Cassell, Smith, Grunberg, Boan & Thomas,
Comparing Costs of Hospital and Community Care, 23 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 197
(1972); Sheehan & Atkinson, Comparative Costs of State Hospital and Community-Based
Inpatient Care in Texas: Who Benefits Most?, 25 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 242
(1974).
THE RIGHT TO AFTERCARE
to our mentally ill citizens when we forcibly subject them to the
realities of present-day institutional life: the promise that the mental
institutional experience will be one which will help them overcome
their psychological problems and better enable them to live fuller and
more useful lives in free society.
Whether a state's obligation to provide aftercare to the discharged
public mental patient is found in due process, equal protection, or
the eighth amendment, its genesis is the intolerable conditions and
practices that have been the hallmark of the public mental institution.
If and when the concept of the right to institutional treatment becomes
fully developed, uniformily recognized, and adequately enforced, the
need for aftercare services may be substantially diminished. But until
we can confidently assure ourselves that the burdens imposed upon
the mental patient are minimal, and that the institutional experience
will in fact be beneficial in terms of improving his capacity to achieve
the full measure of his potential as a free individual, the provision of
aftercare must be viewed as constitutionally and morally mandated.
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